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ARTICLES
TWO CONCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY:
TRADITIONAL AND PERFECTIONIST APPROACHES
TO ISSUES OF MORALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
EVELYN KEYES*
Political theory is a branch of moral philosophy, which starts from
the discovery, or application, of moral notions in the sphere of
political relations.
-Isaiah Berlin 1
I. INTRODUCTION: Two CONCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
Two radically different conceptions of judicial integrity in
resolving cases that present controversial moral issues of liberty
and equality have vied for preeminence in American jurispru-
dence for half a century. Traditional jurists contend that the pos-
itive law is itself systemically moral and that judges can and
should decide all cases-including those that present controver-
sial moral issues of liberty and equality-within the constraints of
the standards, rules, and precedents in the positive law. Jurists
who adopt Ronald Dworkin's perfectionist view2 of "law as integ-
* Justice, Texas Court of Appeals, First District; B.A., Tulane University;
M.A., Ph.D., University of Texas; M.A., Ph.D., Rice University; J.D., University of
Houston Law Center. Special thanks to John Mixon, Matt Cooper, and Jim
Hawkins for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions.
1. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERY (1958), reprinted in THE
PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 191, 193 (Henry Hardy ed., 2000).
2. I have adopted the term "perfectionist" from CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADI-
GALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA
26-39 (2005). For Sunstein, the "perfectionist" legal theorist "believe[s] that
the continuing judicial taskis to make the [Constitution] as good as it can be by
interpreting its broad terms in a way that cases its ideals in the best possible
light." Id. at 32. Sunstein contrasts this theorist with the "minimalist," who is
"cautious about undoing the fabric of existing law," and with the "fundamental-
ist," whose "goal is to return to ... the views of those who ratified the docu-
ment." Id. at 26, 29. This paper contrasts traditional jurisprudence, which has
affinities with both minimalism and originalism, but is neither, with
perfectionism.
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rity" contend that the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process
Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment incorporate comprehen-
sive abstract moral principles of liberty and equality to which the
positive law3 should, but often does not, conform;4 that judicial
opinions based solely on the "conventional" sources in the posi-
tive law are merely "backward looking factual reports" that can-
not resolve the novel and controversial moral issues presented by
legal cases;5 that it is, in any event, a "category mistake" for
judges to resolve moral issues by non-moral techniques;6 and that
judges should, therefore, read the Constitution "morally," i.e.,
they should construe the principles of liberty and equality in the
Constitution in accordance with the community's best construc-
tion of the moral requirements of decency and fairness and
should implement the true democratic conditions of liberty and
equality.7
3. I define the "positive law" as the standard complex of rules, statutes,
and case law that american law-making officials have declared to be the law. See
RONALD DWORKIN,JUSTICE IN ROBES 211 (2006) [hereinafter DwoRKIN, JUSTICE).
4. The conception that morality and the positive law have no necessary
relationship is deeply embedded in twentieth-century jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 96-98 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW's
EMPIRE]; H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 151-53, 181-207 (1961) (describ-
ing "law as a means of social control" and acknowledging "the influence of both
the accepted social morality and wider moral ideals" on law, but denying any
necessary systematic connection between law and morality); see also Richard Pos-
ner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1637, 1694,
1698 (1998) (claiming that morality and law are "parallel methods of social
control" that often overlap but have no "necessary or organic connection" and
that "moral issues are only a subset of the normative considerations that are
potentially relevant to adjudication" and "can be elided, or recast as issues of
interpretation, institutional competence, practical politics, the separation of
powers, or stare decisis-or treated as a compelling reason for judicial
abstention").
5. See DwORIaN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 114-17, 225 (describing
traditional jurisprudence as mere "conventionalism" and arguing that it cannot
provide any justification for the resolution of issues that "have not been settled
one way or the other by whatever institutions have conventional authority to
decide them"); see also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S
LAW]; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82-84 (1978) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, RIGHTS]; Posner, supra note 4, at 1693 (attributing to Dworkin the
position that "the standard sources of positive law in our system do not resolve
most of the novel issues that judges must decide").
6. Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1718,
1728 (1998).
7. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 225. By "traditional jurispru-
dence," I mean the judging most judges do most of the time when they apply
the positive law to the facts of particular cases. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, What IAte
for Breakfast and Other Mysteries ofJudicial Decision-Making, in JUDGES ON JUDGING
76, 78-79 (David M. O'Brien, ed. 2004) (1993) ("[T]here are more or less
2WO CONCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL IArI'EGRITY
In this paper, I take up Dworkin's perfectionist challenge to
traditional jurisprudence from a new perspective. I argue that,
contrary to Dworkin's assertions, the positive law is not a fortui-
tously moral set of backward-looking factual reports; nor is tradi-
tional jurisprudence inadequate to resolve constitutional issues
of liberty and equality. Rather, the positive law of the United
States is an organic, self-creating, self-sustaining, and self-cor-
recting-or "autopoietic"-system of publicly enforced legal
principles and rights derived from intrinsically moral procedural
and substantive principles set out in the founding documents of
the United States, primarily the Constitution. And the role of
judges, as conceived by the Founders and adhered to by tradi-
tional jurists, is to preserve this system, or social compact, as a
flourishing entity by preserving, protecting, and defending the
positive law, refining and extending it only incrementally as
necessitated by the facts of particular cases.
In Dworkin's perfectionist conception of law as integrity, the
Bill of Rights is "a network of principles, some extremely con-
crete, others more abstract, and some of near limitless abstrac-
tion."' This system is "comprehensive, because it commands both
equal concern and basic liberty," which are "the two major
sources of claims of individual right."'" These two great moral
concepts are embodied in the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and because "liberty and
objective principles by which the law operates, principles that dictate the rea-
soning and often the result in most cases."). As a philosophical program, tradi-
tional jurisprudence probably comes closest to what Dworkin calls
"conventionalism," or legal positivism, but without the philosophical basis
attributed to legal positivism by Dworkin and legal positivists like Hart. See
DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 114-17, 225; HART, supra note 4, at
77-120. Although Dworkin has written that "[t]he political influence of legal
positivism [or the theory that a community's law consists only of what its law-
making officials have declared to be the law] is no longer an important force
either in legal practice or in legal education." DWORKIN,JUSTICE, supra note 3, at
211. There remain influential jurists and thinkers who analyze the positive law,
including constitutional law, as a body of principles evolving in the context of
precedents, standards, and rules. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW
Is (2004). I do not attribute to these thinkers, however, the philosophical the-
ory of the grounds of traditional jurisprudence developed in the paper.
8. The term "autopoiesis" is derived from the Greek word for "self-creat-
ing." It was coined by biologists Humberto Maturana and FranciscoJ. Varela to
describe living systems, or autonomous and strictly bounded systems that are
shaped by their interactions with the environment over time so as to maintain
the system and the relations between its parts. H.R. MATURANA & F.J. VAREtA,
AuToPOlESIS AND COGNITION 78-79 (1980). I am grateful to John Mixon for
drawing my attention to the term "autopoietic."
9. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 5, at 73.
10. Id.
2008]
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equality overlap in large part," these two clauses contain all of the
fundamental individual rights that incorporate the principles of
liberty and equality." Indeed, Dworkin argues, anyone who
believes that free and equal citizens would be guaranteed a par-
ticular individual right would likely also think the Constitution
already contains that right, unless constitutional history has deci-
sively rejected it. 12 "[I1t is very likely," he states, "that, even if
there had been no First Amendment, American courts would
long ago have found the freedoms of speech, press, and religion
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of basic
liberty."'"
Dworkin further argues that because "[o]ur legal culture
insists that judges-and finally the justices of the Supreme
Court-have the last word about the proper interpretation of the
Constitution," and because "the great clauses command simply
that government show equal concern and respect for the basic
liberties-without specifying in further detail what that means
and requires-it falls to judges to declare what equal concern
really does require and what the basic liberties really are."'
4
Judges should, therefore, interpret the constitutional principles
of liberty and equality "on the understanding that they invoke
moral principles about political decency and justice,"' 5 recogniz-
ing that "propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow
from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due pro-
cess that provide the best constructive interpretation of the com-
munity's legal practice."'" Dworkin acknowledges his theory
entails "that judges must answer intractable, controversial, and
profound questions of political morality" and that "the rest of us
must accept the deliverances of a majority of the justices, whose
insight into these great issues is not spectacularly special"'" and
that this consequence "seems unfair, even frightening" and
"seems to give judges almost incredible power."' 8 However, he
argues this method of deciding morally controversial cases is jus-





14. Id. at 74.
15. Id. at 2.
16. See DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 225; see also DWORKIN,
FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 5, at 94-96, 114-20, 254-58.
17. DWORK1N, FREEDOM'S LAw, supra note 5, at 74.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 343 ("The great constitutional clauses set out extremely
abstract moral principles that must be interpreted before they can be applied,
00TWO CONCEPI7ONS OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
On the traditionalist view developed below, the substantive
rights in the Constitution do not collapse into comprehensive
basic principles of liberty and equality that judges are free to
define for society and implement to ensure true democratic con-
ditions. Rather, the positive law consists of an organic body of
intrinsically moral substantive and procedural principles and
rights with the Constitution at its apex. The traditional process of
rational legal decision making from those principles in accor-
dance with the plain language of the Constitution, precedent,
and the facts of particular cases is likewise moral; and that pro-
cess can resolve even the most morally controversial social issues
presented by legal cases while preserving the moral integrity of
the law itself. Indeed, on this view, judicial integrity consists pre-
cisely in a judge's adhering to the positive law, and not in his
importing into the law the "best constructive interpretation of
the community's legal practice" based on his independent
understanding of the rational requirements of abstract moral
principle.2" Not only is it unnecessary for judges to read the Con-
stitution morally to resolve cases that present constitutional
issues of liberty and equality, but judges who do so necessarily
contravene the moral and legal structure of the Constitution
itself and its procedurally and substantively moral directives.
The traditionalist conception of judicial integrity as judicial
restraint and Dworkin's conception of "law as integrity" are thus
diametrically opposed. How these opposing views are philosoph-
ically justified, how they operate in actual judicial decision mak-
ing, how they have shaped modern American rights-based
jurisprudence, and what their use portends for future jurispru-
dence and social governance are the subject of this paper. I con-
clude that traditional jurisprudence better protects the moral
conditions of a just democratic society.
II. MORALTY AND LAW
Both traditional judges, who interpret the Constitution in
light of its plain language and the strict rules and precedents in
the positive law, and judges who read the Constitution morally,
and thus assume a normative role in assuring that the law reflects
the true moral conditions of a democratic society, agree that a
just society is a moral society, or one whose laws are intrinsically
moral and one in which the implementation of the law is fair to
all. But traditional judges faced with resolving cases that present
and any interpretation will commit the interpreter to answers to fundamental
questions of political morality and philosophy.").
20. See supra text accompanying note 7.
2008]
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controversial moral issues would argue that their task as judges is
to preserve the morality built into the law while refusing to
enforce laws or promulgate rules of law that do not conform to
that embedded morality, while judges who read the Constitution
morally would deny that the positive law is intrinsically moral and
capable of resolving moral issues. They would argue that moral
issues presented by legal cases can "truly" be resolved only by
judicial recourse to the philosophically best construction of
moral principle. Therefore, a defense of the claim that tradi-
tional jurisprudence preserves morality embedded in the law
must begin with a defense of the claims that the positive law is
intrinsically moral and that traditional judicial decision making is
itself a moral process that is capable of producing morally sound
decisions. I begin, therefore, with the concept of morality.
A. Intrinsic Morality and Law
I take as fundamental the axiom that moral value inheres
intrinsically in life itself, and I define morality categorically as the
complex of moral interests, rights, principles, and decisions that
derives from and entails recognition of, and respect for, the
intrinsic value of human life. This view is shared by Dworkin, who
has stated that "we almost all accept [the premise] that human
life in all its forms is sacred-that it has intrinsic and objective
value quite apart from any value it might have to the person
whose life it is" and who likewise takes "the abstract right to con-
cern and respect . . . to be fundamental and axiomatic. "2
I further take it to be axiomatic that the governing laws of a
society are moral-and not merely a "means of social control"
with no necessary connection to moralityZ2-precisely insofar as
they incorporate procedural and substantive principles and
rights that recognize and respect the intrinsic dignity and worth
of each member of society. This is also Dworkin's governing pre-
cept, with the caveat that Dworkin does not agree the positive law
of the United States is intrinsically moral and kept moral by the
operation of the system itself. Rather, Dworkin's "law as integrity"
is justified precisely because it implements the "true" governing
principles and rights of a moral democratic society from outside
the positive law that lacks them.2" Thus, my counterclaim
requires an argument, and again I begin as Dworkin does-with
rights.
21. Ronald Dworkin, Life is Sacred. That's the Easy Part, N.Y. TIMES M-AG.,
May 16, 1993, at 36; see also DwoRKN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 5, at 84.
22. See HART, supra note 4, at 151.
23. See DwoRKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw, supra note 5, at 21-27.
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B. Abstract Moral and Legal Reasoning
If morality is understood as respect for the intrinsic dignity
and worth of every human being, it rationally follows that all
human beings have moral interests, i.e., they all possess dignity and
the abstract right to be treated with respect, both substantively
and procedurally.24 Thus, in Kantian terms, treating human
beings as lacking intrinsic worth-treating them as mere objects
or commodities without moral interests worthy of respect-is cat-
egorically inconsistent with morality.25 Moreover, because there
is nothing in the concept of morality itself to distinguish a moral
interest, or right to respect, in one person from the same interest
in another person, moral reasoning requires that all equal moral
interests be treated equally, or that the moral interests of every
person affected by a moral choice be treated as equal to those of
every other similarly situated person. I take this aspect of rational
moral theory to be undisputed. But procedural equality is not the
only essential attribute of moral reason.
As each moral agent is both an autonomous actor in making
moral decisions and an object of the moral decisions made by
himself and others, morality as respect for the intrinsic dignity
and worth of every person rationally implies not only equal
respect for equal moral interests, whoever possesses them, but
also respect for the equal moral autonomy, or personal liberty, of
each person as both agent and object of moral choices. In other
words, morality as respect for the equal individual dignity and
worth of every person requires that all moral agents respect the
right of each moral agent to determine for himself how the dig-
nity and worth of each person affected by his decision would be
best respected, assuming he himself were to be in any of the posi-
tions subject to his own decision. Thus, each rational moral agent
must make his moral decisions as if he were to be subject to his
own decisions and were to have the same respect for the moral
interests, or rights6 and liberties,2 7 of others as for his own.
24. See DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 5, at xv.
25. Indeed, this Kantian concept of persons as "ends in themselves" may
be taken as the core insight in modern moral theory, and it is certainly the core
insight in modern deontological moral and political theory. See IMMANUEL
KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 9, 46-49 (Robert Paul
Wolff ed., Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1959) (1785). Kant, however,
locates intrinsic value in reason, that is, in an absolutely good will, rather than
in the anterior ground of life itself. Id. at 9.
26. Black's Law Dictionary defines the concept of "right" in terms both
moral and legal:
Right. As a noun, and taken in an abstract sense, means justice, ethical
correctness, or consonance with the rules of law or the principles of
morals. In this signification it answers to one meaning of the Latin
2008]
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Rational moral decision making thus requires us to recog-
nize that all persons whose interests are affected by our choices
place demands upon our moral consideration: they have moral
interests that are assimilable to abstract moral rights or liberties
equally inhering in all similarly situated persons. Those rights, in
turn, correlate with moral principles we recognize as rules of
moral decision making generally applicable to all similarly situ-
ated persons. Because each person is equally entitled to respect
as both moral agent and the object of moral choice, and because
moral rights inhere in similarly situated persons of equal intrinsic
moral worth, moral reason itself requires that the equal interests
of affected persons be treated equally under equal circumstances
and also that the law be made in such a way that each moral
agent, reasoning morally, would willingly subject himself to it.
Because this abstract model of moral reasoning respects the
equality and liberty of all persons as both agents and objects of
moral decision making, it is intrinsically both moral and demo-
cratic, and to the extent a moral decision is reached logically the
decision is both rational and procedurally fair.
"jus," and serves to indicate law in the abstract, considered as the foun-
dation of all rights, or the complex of underlying moral principles
which impart the character of justice to all positive law, or give it an
ethical content. As a noun, and taken in a concrete sense, a power, privi-
lege, faculty, or demand, inherent in one person and incident upon
another....
As an adjective, the term "right" meansjust, morally correct, con-
sonant with ethical principles or rules of positive law. It is the opposite
of wrong, unjust, illegal.
A power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution,
statutes or decisional laws, or claimed as a result of long usage.
BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 1189 (5th ed. 1979).
27. See KANT, supra note 25, at 54-57. Black's Law Dictionary likewise also
defines "liberty" in both moral and legal terms:
Liberty. Freedom; exemption from extraneous control. Freedom from
all restraints except such as are justly imposed by law. Freedom from
restraint, under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the
same right by others; freedom regulated by law....
The power of the will to follow the dictates of its unrestricted
choice, and to direct the external acts of the individual without
restraint, coercion, or control from other persons.
The word "liberty" includes and comprehends all personal rights
and their enjoyment.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 827. The word "liberty" as used in
the state and federal constitutions means, in a negative sense, freedom from
restraint, but in a positive sense, it involves the idea of freedom secured by the
imposition of restraint, and it is in this positive sense that the state, in the exer-
cise of its police powers, promotes the freedom of all by the imposition upon
particular persons of restraints which are deemed necessary for the general
welfare.
7WO CONCEJTONS OFJUDICIAL IANT-EGRTY
Both moral philosophers and traditional and perfectionist
judges, I believe, can agree that moral reasoning incorporates
the foregoing principles. Indeed, the model of moral reason I
have described merely reflects the Kantian categorical imperative
of moral reason.28 I further contend, however, that the model
applies not only to moral reasoning but also to the process of fair
and rational legal reasoning in accordance with the constitutional
principles of equality and due process, i.e., legal reason is a type
of practical moral reason. Indeed, the essential attribute of moral
reasoning that every person affected by a moral decision be
treated the same as every other similarly situated person may be
taken as the core of the concept of procedural equality embodied
in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
29
Likewise, the respect due each person as both the maker and the
object of moral choices may be taken as the essential moral core
of the concept of procedural liberty or due process that underlies the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth30 and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." But nothing I have said so far tells us how a moral agent,
or a judge, can rationally determine whether a procedurally
rational and fair decision is substantively fair, or the "best" that
can be made in a given set of empirical circumstances. That is,
28. See KANT, supra note 25, at 39, 45-59.
29. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part,
Section 1 .... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5 .... Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964)
(" [T] he concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed as requiring
the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the govern-
mental action questioned or challenged.").
30. The Fifth Amendment provides, inter alia, that no person shall "be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V, § 1.
31. SeeW. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) ("[T]he liberty
safeguarded [by due process] is liberty in a social organization which requires
the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals
and welfares of the people .... [R]egulation which is reasonable in relation to
its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.").
But see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (declaring that liberty
under law extends to the full range of conduct the individual is free to pursue,
which may not be restricted except for proper governmental purpose). See gen-er-
ally KANT, supra note 25, at 51-52 (describing moral agents as universal legisla-
tors in a world of ends).
20081
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nothing I have said so far tells us what practical judgment should
follow on abstract moral or legal reasoning.
C. Practical Moral and Legal Judgment
Essential to the understanding of empirical fairness-but
lost to perfectionist moral and political philosophy-is the recog-
nition that practical moral judgment cannot be reduced to the
rational application of universal abstract moral principles irre-
spective of empirical circumstances without consequences for
both abstract and empirical fairness. Unlike abstract moral rea-
soning, practical moral judgments are, by definition, made under
empirical conditions. Thus, they have substantive content; they
affect real people under real empirical circumstances; and,
because they are empirical applications of principle and instanti-
ate empirical rights, they are subject to empirical constraints that
must be recognized and fairly and rationally accomodated to
maintain the morality of any applied, or practical, social system.
First, no substantive moral principles or rights, despite their
abstract universal form, are applicable in all empirical circum-
stances. Rather, in any given area of practical moral concern
under empirical conditions, only certain substantive moral prin-
ciples and their correlative rights apply, i.e., applied moral prin-
ciples have empirical boundaries. Second, persons in different
empirical positions are not affected the same way by a practical
moral choice; their implicated moral interests are different
because their positions are not only abstractly but factually differ-
ent and because some factual considerations are more relevant
in a given context than others, i.e., some facts are material to the
practical decision-making process while others are not. Third,
practical moral decisions are made under imperfect conditions
of knowledge, both as to all relevant facts and principles and as
to the full empirical consequences of alternative choices, so that
a practical moral choice cannot be known to be objectively or
necessarily "true" or the objectively "best" moral choice among
all possible choices that could be made.
Fourth, and finally, in empirical conditions, the moral inter-
ests of those persons who will be affected by a moral choice may
conflict with each other and with other interests, generating an
empirical moral nexus in which one interest may be satisfied by
the rational moral agent only at the expense of another and
entailing the need for an evaluative process, or method of practi-
cal moral judgment, by which a rational and fair moral agent can
weigh empirical alternatives and resolve conflicts among the pos-
sible empirical outcomes of his choice by deciding which princi-
TWO CONCEPTIONS OFJUDICIAL INTEGRITY
pie is more fundamental and should be enforced and its
correlative rights instantiated. Thus, practical moral judgment
requires a means for determining the relative weights of rights
whose instantiation is sought, that is, it requires a means of evalu-
ation to determine the better, and ultimately best, result.
I submit that unless some external authoritative source
determines that one right is necessarily more fundamental, or
weightier, than another in given circumstances, the process of
repeated comparisons of rights against each other itself
prescribes which rights are weightier in which types of situations.
Thus the process of repeatedly making rational practical moral
judgments creates a hierarchy of rights in which fundamental
substantive moral rights or liberties are simply those intrinsically
moral rights that, when weighed by a moral agent against other
applicable vested rights, or interests, dominate and determine
the outcome of moral judgments in case after case, either
because the substantive interests they instantiate are broader or
because they are deemed most critical. Over time, substantive
rights that are reinforced as weightier in situation after situation
or in the most critical situations become enshrined in the moral
life of a person, or indeed of a community, as virtually objective
correlatives to fundamental substantive moral principles.
A choice made according to principles of moral reason gives
logical priority to more fundamental principles over lesser ones
and instantiates those rights which, when compared against the
alternatives, are, in the moral agent's considered view, the
weightiest, or the most conducive to the furthering of the moral
interests of all affected persons under the circumstances, and
thus most conducive to beneficence or the good. Given the
moral, rational, and empirical constraints on practical moral
choice, the "best" or "moral" decision among actual empirical
alternatives is that decision to which the rational moral agent
would willingly subject himself as best if he were in any of the
positions affected by his own decision when he rationally com-
pares the available alternatives in light of the material facts, the
hierarchy of applicable governing principles, and the foreseeable
consequences. Thus, the ultimate moral and rational justification
for any practical moral choice, or applied moral judgment, rela-
tive to the alternatives, is its tendency to best preserve and fur-
ther the interests of human dignity and worth overall under the
applicable circumstances in the judgment of the rational moral
agent who perceives himself as potentially subject to his own
decision and who treats all affected persons as he would treat
himself were he to occupy any of their positions.
20081
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On this view, a rational moral agent is an autonomous par-
ticipant in the implementation of moral choices that affect him-
self and others, and he is bound by reason and morality to treat
equal moral interests, or rights and liberties, as equally worthy of
respect, whether in himself or others, and to apply the same pro-
cess of rational moral reasoning and moral judgment in every
situation implicating moral concerns, taking into account the
operative procedural and substantive principles, the facts, and
the relative weight of the rights whose instantiation is sought.
When the substantive principles followed and the rights instanti-
ated are intrinsically moral and rationally judged most conducive
to the good, the outcomes the process produces are themselves
intrinsically rational and moral, and the living moral system to
which such judgments contribute is kept fair insofar as the pro-
cess is followed, i.e., insofar as the moral agent acts both ration-
ally and morally. Repeated rational moral judgments thus create
a personal moral code that is self-creating and self-correcting and
that is instantiated by individual, intrinsically-moral substantive
judgments made in accordance with the abstract principles of
moral reason and moral judgment, ensuring both procedural
and substantive fairness.
I submit that, just as abstract legal reason has the same form
as abstract moral reason, so rational, moral legal judgment has
the same form as practical, or applied, moral judgment. Specifi-
cally, in making a rational and moral legal decision, the judge
begins with the facts and the legal principles applicable to the
case, applies the rules and standards in the law, and reasons logi-
cally from the law as applied to the facts to the conclusion,
instantiating that alternative which best realizes the values in the
positive law and maintains the coherence of the whole. Thus,
insofar as a legal system, or code, is substantively moral, the judg-
ments made by judges within the legal system in accordance with
intrinsically moral processes of legal reasoning will themselves be
intrinsically moral and will contribute to the integrity of the
whole as part of a living, organic, intrinsically moral system, and
laws and judgments not in accordance with those principles will
be rejected. Correspondingly, if a legal system is not systemically
moral, but incorporates principles that conflict with the require-
ments of procedural and substantive morality, the moral integrity
of the system and its judges can be maintained only by judges
invalidating the offending laws from outside the system by follow-
ing truly moral principles and instantiating truly moral rights.
That, of course, is the dilemma addressed by Dworkin, which is
based upon the assumptions that the government and laws of the
United States are not systemically moral, that they do not self-
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correct, and that both law and society cannot be made "truly"
moral unless they are made to conform to abstract philosophic
conceptions of morality and justice as independently understood
by judges. Traditional jurisprudence is defensible, therefore,
only if Dworkin's assumptions are wrong. The question is how we
can know that the American legal system is moral and how it is
systematically kept moral by its own operation so that judges who
decide cases within the positive law are justified in believing that
the body of law to which their opinions contribute is moral, and
that by following and contributing to that law they maintain its-
and their-moral integrity.
III. THE MORAL INTEGRITY OF THE POSITVE LAW
I submit-and I believe perfectionists would agree-that an
actual representative democracy that is governed by a set of
intrinsically moral substantive and procedural principles, or laws,
that respect the intrinsic liberty and equality of all is a moral soci-
ety. The question is how that society is achieved, In my view, the
essential difference between an individual moral code and a
moral society in the form of a constitutional representative
democracy is merely that, in such a democracy, the general laws
that affect all on the social plane are made communally by
elected representatives of all for all, rather than by individuals for
themselves; the votes for and of the elected representatives are of
equal weight and are aggregated by an impartial principle of
aggregation; and the laws made by those representatives are
enforced by all against all in furtherance of the common good as
the people collectively perceive it. Should the aggregating princi-
ple in electing representatives and promulgating legislation be
the one-person, one-vote principle coupled with majority rule,
the resulting institutions and laws will be both intrinsically moral
and intrinsically democratic in that they will respect the equal
moral autonomy and worth of each person in electing represent-
atives and in making the laws for themselves through those
elected representatives.
I maintain that the positive law of the United States is just
such an intrinsically moral, organic, self-sustaining-or auto-
poietic-system and that the American social compact consists in
the ongoing process of generation and implementation on the
social plane, by the American people, through their representa-
tives, and for their own governance, of those intrinsically moral
substantive and procedural laws they themselves have collectively
deemed to be most conducive to their own common good. The
body of the positive law that implements the provisions in the
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Constitution has systemic moral integrity because the Constitu-
tion, like the other founding documents of the United States, is
itself a morally sound document; the laws subordinate to it are
kept morally sound by their conformity to it; and the ongoing
interpretation of the law by impartial judges in accordance with
rule, precedent, and the facts of particular cases produces an
organic, incrementally evolving, body of law that is systemically
moral, self-creating, and self-correcting.
That the organizing principles and enabling laws of the
United States government are intrinsically moral is evident from
an examination of its foundational documents.
The Declaration of Independence justified separation from
the British crown and the formation of a new government on the
grounds that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness, [t]hat to
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed, [and] [t] hat whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Gov-
ernment, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
3 2
The American Constitution, in turn, proclaimed that the
government of the United States was expressly ordained and
established by the representatives of the people "in order to form
a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquil-
ity, provide for the common defense, promote the general wel-
32. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). This concep-
tion of a just society manifests the influence of Locke's theory of the social
compact as an agreement of free people to give up their freedom to act individ-
ually in order to better preserve their lives, liberty, and property and to further
"the peace, safety and public good" as they themselves define it, and the agree-
ment of the Founders that decisions affecting the whole be taken by the whole
on a democratic basis. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 68
(C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690) ("[M]en, when they
enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in
the state of nature.., only with an intention in every one the better to preserve
himself, his liberty and property .... And so whoever has the legislative or
supreme power of any common-wealth, is bound to govern by established stand-
ing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary
decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by
those laws .... And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety,
and public good of the people.").
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fare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity."3" And, in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall
reaffirmed the "original right" of the people to establish a gov-
ernment subject to those principles they deemed most conducive
to their own collective happiness, stating:
That the people have an original right to establish, for
their future government, such principles as, in their opin-
ion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis
on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The
exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor
can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The princi-
ples, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental.
And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme,
and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.3 4
The American social compact is thus consciously founded on a
moral base, namely, the "original right" of free people to estab-
lish for themselves a government of those laws they deem most
conducive to their own safety and happiness.35 And the supreme
instrument for protecting and furthering that ideal is the Consti-
tution, which was drafted by delegates of the people for their
own governance and approved by the people through ratification
by the states, and which incorporates those intrinsically moral,
procedural, and substantive constraints on personal liberty and
the exercise of the power of the State that were, in the estimation
of the Framers and the states which adopted the Constitution,
vital to the preservation and rational furtherance of the common
good.
The Constitution sets out the Founders' and their succes-
sors' conception of the fundamental enabling principles of a just
society.36 Drafted by delegates of the people and approved by the
people, the Constitution assures the people's ultimate determi-
33. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
34. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (emphasis
added); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-05 (1819).
35. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971) (arguing that ideal
representative persons behind a veil of ignorance as to their future position in
society would choose as principles of a just society his two principles of "fair-
ness," namely (1) the principle that "each person is to have an equal right to
the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others," and
(2) the principle that "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and
(b) attached to positions and offices open to all").
36. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405-07 ("[The Constitution's]
nature, therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea
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nation of, and responsibility for, the moral and political justness
of the law, both substantively and procedurally.37 In addition to
the original moral and political right of self-government, the
amendments to the Constitution enumerate fundamental sub-
stantive moral principles, according rights to all, inter alia, to
associate freely with others, to practice religion freely, to speak
freely, and to possess their persons, homes, and property without
fear of arbitrary governmental intrusion. The Ninth and Tenth
amendments, more abstractly, ensure the substantive personal
liberties traditionally held by the people against intrusion by the
State.38
Finally, and most abstractly, the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments incorporate the two great democratic moral princi-
ples of liberty and equality as procedural constitutional require-
ments of all legal decision-making, whether by judges or by
legislatures, assuring fundamental procedural fairness in the
making of laws and the rendering of judicial opinions.39 But
these two amendments do not, by anything in their express lan-
guage, override or subsume the constitutional principles guaran-
teeing substantive rights and liberties; nor do they have express
was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be
inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the language.").
37. See id. at 403-05 (noting that the Constitution was promulgated by a
convention of delegates elected by state legislatures and was submitted for ratifi-
cation to conventions of delegates "chosen in each state by the people
thereof").
From these conventions the constitution derives its whole author-
ity. The government proceeds directly from the people; is "ordained
and established," in the name of the people; and is declared to be
ordained, "in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice,
insure domestic tranquility, and secure the blessings of liberty to them-
selves and to their posterity." ...
* .* The government of the Union, then ... is, emphatically, and
truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it ema-
nates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exer-
cised directly on them, and for their benefit.
Id.
38. The Ninth Amendment provides, "The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Tenth Amendment pro-
vides, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
39. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan,J., con-
curring) (recognizing that concepts of equal protection of laws and due process
both stem from the American ideal of fairness); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499-500 (1954) (holding that equal protection and due process both stem
from the American ideal of fairness).
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substantive moral content of their own. Rather, the Fourteenth
Amendment expressly reserves to Congress, not to the courts, the
"power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article,"4 just as the Tenth Amendment assures to state legis-
latures the "police power" that protects the public health, safety,
welfare, and morals.4"
The Constitution, as designed, provides substantive moral
principles that act as constraints in intrinsically moral areas of
concern, and it provides intrinsically moral procedural principles
for use in every case of legal decision making, and these together
ensure that the positive law is kept moral. While these substantive
and procedural constitutional principles are supreme, they are in
no sense independent of the body of the law they structure and
guide, but are one with it; nor are any of the parts of the system
dispensable. Rather, the Constitution constitutes the essential
structural document of the living social compact originally
agreed upon by the Founders and continually ratified by Ameri-
cans for their own governance ever since, namely a compact con-
sisting in a hierarchy of agreed upon, evolving, procedural and
substantive laws incorporating the values of the American people
and according legal rights to them, with the Constitution and its
constraints and liberties at its apex.
4 2
Within the political system the Constitution creates, the posi-
tive law is made both by case law building on prior case law and
by representative legislative assemblies elected by the people on a
40. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The "police power" is
[a]n authority conferred... in the Tenth Amendment... upon the
individual states . . . through which they are enabled to . . . place
restraints on the personal freedom and property rights of persons for
the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the promo-
tion of the public convenience and general prosperity. The police
power is subject to limitations of the federal and State constitutions,
and especially to the requirement of due process.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 1041.
42. As explained in The Federalist,
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning
as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legis-
lative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance
between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity
ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution
to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the inten-
tion of their agents.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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one-person, one-vote basis, usually using as the aggregating
principle of decisions applicable to the whole the principle of
majority vote. 4 Both case law and statutes are then interpreted
by judges in accordance with precedent, standards, and rules.
Within this framework, constitutional principles trump statutes,
which, in turn, trump case law interpreting the common law,
45
43. While the conception of legislatures as elected representatives of the
people was in the Constitution from the beginning, the conception of one-per-
son, one-vote as the expression of equality under the law has developed gradu-
ally. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 2, 3; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1;
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (con-
cluding that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal
participation by all voters in the election of state legislators).
44. The majoritarian premise stems from Locke's and the Framers' con-
ception that, to act as one, a community formed by the consent of free people
should be carried by the will of the majority. Locke makes the following
argument:
§ 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every indi-
vidual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one
body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and
determination of the majority: for that which acts any community,
being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary
to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body
should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the
consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue
one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that
united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that
consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in
assemblies, impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set
by that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes
for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the
law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.
LocKE, supra note 32, at 52.
45. This hierarchy is ancient, as observed by Sir Matthew Hale, the classic
authority on the origin of the common law. Hale states:
[T] ho' by Virtue of the Laws of this Realm [udge-made laws] do bind,
as a Law between the Parties thereto, as to the particular Case in Ques-
tion, 'till revers'd by Error or Attaint, yet they do not make a Law prop-
erly so called, (for that only the King and Parliament can do); yet they
have a great Weight and Authority in Expounding, Declaring, and
Publishing what the Law of this Kingdom is, especially when such
Decisions hold a Consonancy and Congruity with Resolutions and
Decisions of former Times; and tho' such Decisions are less than a
Law, yet they are a greater Evidence thereof than the Opinion of any
private Persons, as such, whatsoever.
SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 45
(Charles M. Gray ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) (1713). Likewise, Sir Edward
Coke distinguished judicial decisions as inferior in status to statutes and statutes
as inferior to Magna Carta and to the Charta de Foresta, which would evolve
into the unwritten English constitution. See 1 Sir EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND A9-10 (Omni Publ'ns 1998)
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with all being ever subject to change through constitutional
amendment, statutory enactment, amendment, revocation, and
judicial interpretation. And it is to this living, self-creating, self-
correcting, intrinsically moral social compact that the traditional
conception of the integrity of the positive law and of judges
responds.
IV. JUDICIAL INTEGRITY IN CONSTRUING THE POSITIVE LAW
Within the intrinsically moral American legal system, the
role of the judge as traditionally understood is both rational and
moral. Judicial decision making determines, adjusts, and
enforces the rights of parties in particular cases to a beneficent
end by applying constitutional, statutory, and common-law prin-
ciples, as appropriate, to the facts of particular cases to deter-
mine the enforceable rights of parties and, going forward, the
rights of those future litigants who are similarly situated. In mak-
ing a legal judgment in a case or controversy, a traditional judge
(or panel ofjudges) begins with the empirical facts and the rele-
vant positive law-principles that have substantive moral content.
The judge considers the material facts of the case as presented by
the record in light of the relevant substantive legal principles and
precedent, and, using prescribed, intrinsically moral rules and
standards, he rationally determines the legal rights of the parties
and enters that judgment which best furthers the integrity of the
law within those constraints.
The traditional judge applies the same laws and the same
process ofjudicial decision making to all persons, treats all simi-
larly situated persons alike, and treats constitutional rights or lib-
erties, as construed over time, as more fundamental than
statutory or common law rights, according procedural and sub-
stantive fairness to those whose rights are affected by the judg-
ment, and reaches a conclusion that, ideally, is both logically
valid and empirically sound under the positive law. He then dis-
tinguishes the losing arguments, if colorably valid, and shows
where they went wrong. When the answer to a legal problem is
not clear-cut-as when a constitutional provision or statute con-
tains language that is subject to different interpretations, or the
case law is unsettled, or the case presents an issue of first impres-
sion-he consults precedent and applicable rules of procedure
and construction to determine which outcome is most consistent
with maintaining the integrity of the law. When this process of
(1797). Moral principles are embedded in all these sources of the common law.
See HALE, supra, at 144-45 (setting out constituents of common law); see also
COKE, supra, at A5, A6, A9-10.
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legal reasoning is applied, new cases are judged by their coher-
ence with, and positive contribution to, a body of law that is both
procedurally and substantively fair.
Because the positive law is an empirical system, it is both
open-ended and indeterminate and imperfect. Not only do the
laws and facts deemed relevant differ from case to case, but
rational and moral judges may use different interpretive tech-
niques, weigh outcomes differently, or err.46 But the positive law
is not, therefore, only fortuitously moral and rational; rather, it is
systemically self-creating, self-sustaining, and self-correcting.
Within this system, judicial opinions constrain both each other
and the construction and scope of general laws, maintaining sys-
temic integrity. Judge-made law, or case law, is incorporated into
a flexible body of positive law that grows and changes incre-
mentally. It gives way, however, to statutory law when the need
for a uniform general law arises, and both case law and statutory
law are constrained to conform to more fundamental constitu-
tional principles, all being subject to ongoing refinement byjudi-
cial decisions in particular cases that are kept uniform through
adherence to "strict rules and precedents."47 Traditional juris-
prudence thus acts as a force for flexibility, stability, and progress
in the law and as a check on any tendency in the judiciary to
reach beyond the bounds of interpretation to become legislators,
or makers of general laws. And adherence to traditional judicial
decision making within the framework of the positive law pro-
vides a basis for a judge's belief that in making the decision
required by law he is himself acting morally, or with integrity, to
preserve and contribute to a system of laws that is itself just.
Indeed, the integrity of the system depends upon the shared
expectation that law-makers and judges will play by the rules of
the game, i.e., they will follow the standard rules and precedents
46. Judicial strategies for deciding cases and methods of statutory and
constitutional construction clearly vary and have been the subjects of entire
schools of jurisprudence. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. Rv. 1457 (2003) (distinguishing four types of
judicial decision-making: traditional, political, strategic, and litigant-driven);
Timothy P. Terrell, Statutory Epistemology: Mapping the Interpretation Debate, 53
EMORy L.J. 523 (2004) (rejecting the notion that there is a "right" way to inter-
pret statutes); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 2.
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 42, at 471;
see also id. at 465-67 ("[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body
between the people and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep
the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the
laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact,
and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law.").
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produced by the system itself and will not change the rules to fit
their own conception of morality.
Dworkin's objectivist conception of "law as integrity" is radi-
cally different. Starting from the assumption that the positive law
is not intrinsically moral, except insofar as it conforms to the best
philosophical interpretation of the rational requirements of "the
two major claims of equal concern and basic liberty" in the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses, Dworkin contends that
"propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the
principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that
provide the best constructive interpretation of the community's
legal practice."4 Judges of integrity are not bound by precedent
and rule, but are committed to telling "an overall story worth
telling now, a story with a complex claim: that present practice
can be organized by and justified in principles sufficiently attrac-
tive to provide an honorable future," just as literary critics
"teas [e] out the various dimensions of value in a complex play or
poem," or "a group of novelists writes a novel seriatim," each writ-
ing his chapter "so as to make the novel being constructed the
best it can be."49 A judge who, in deciding cases, construes and
enforces the principles of liberty and equality in the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in accordance with the best constructive interpreta-
tion of the community's practice participates in constructing the
conditions of the truly democratic and just society.
Unlike traditional jurisprudence, Dworkin's perfectionist
jurisprudence is a teleological, or end-based, jurisprudence in
which the abstract principles of liberty and equality, as inter-
preted by judges bound only by reason and their best construc-
tive moral judgment, determine the just result in legal cases and
thus implement the "true" principles of a just society. The result
of this reasoning directly from abstract principles of justice to
empirical propositions of law philosophically determined to be
true is not a strictly construed decision on the law and the facts of
a particular case that contributes incrementally to the positive
law, but a general substantive law that trumps any inconsistent
positive laws made by the people themselves or by past case law in
accordance with the actual moral values of the people, even if
those laws are consistent with the express language and historical
interpretation of the Constitution. In this jurisprudence, the
courts, and not the people, become the moral arbiters of society
48. DwoRKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 5, at 225.
49. Id. at 227-29.
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and the guarantors of social, as well as individual, justice. They,
and not the people, are the moral law-makers.
The distinction between perfectionist and traditional juris-
prudence is not merely academic. These two methods ofjudicial
decision-making have vied to shape the legal landscape with
respect to morality and social justice for the last half century.
V. THE PERFECTIONIST CONSTRUCTION
OF CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY
Dworkin views Brown v. Board of Education as the case that
introduced the moral reading of the Constitution into Supreme
Court jurisprudence.50 I agree.
Brown represents the Supreme Court's judgment on a set of
consolidated cases from several states premised on different facts
and local conditions, but all presenting a single legal question:
whether the segregation of children in public schools solely on
the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other
"tangible" factors were equal, deprived the children of the
minority group of equal educational opportunities in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.5 All of the plaintiff children had
been denied relief under the "separate-but-equal" doctrine estab-
lished almost sixty years earlier in Plessy v. Ferguson,52 in which the
Supreme Court had held that equal treatment was accorded
when the races were provided substantially equal, if separate,
transportation facilities.
53
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Brown by looking to
The Slaughter-House Cases and Strauder v. West Virginia, in which it
had construed the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1870s to
contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or
right, most valuable to the colored race-the right to
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them dis-
tinctively as colored-exemption from legal discrimina-
tions, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the
security of their enjoyment of the rights which others
enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reduc-
ing them to the condition of a subject race. 4
50. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see DwORKIN, RIGHTS,
supra note 5, at 26-27.
51. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486-88, 493.
52. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
53. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 488.
54. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879); see also In re
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-72 (1873).
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The Court opined, however, that despite these early cases recog-
nizing a substantive legal right of African Americans not to be
discriminated against on racial grounds, it could not determine
with any certainty what Congress had in mind in 1868 when it
enacted the Fourteenth Amendment."
The Court then examined the history of cases construing
the Fourteenth Amendment. It observed that initially the amend-
ment had been interpreted as proscribing all state-imposed dis-
crimination against blacks, and that in more recent public
education cases the Court had found the benefits enjoyed by
white and black students to be unequal, but it had not re-
examined the separate-but-equal doctrine.56 The Court did not
rely on the jurisprudence developed with respect to racial ine-
quality in education as applied to the facts of the case, however.
Instead, it took the path it had explicitly refused to take in Sweatt
v. Painter, its then most recent case dealing with racial segrega-
tion in education.57
Rather than deciding the issue before it by construing the
plain language of the Equal Protection Clause in light of evolving
precedent with respect to the personal rights of the plaintiff clas-
ses and the evidence of their unequal educational opportunity
under the challenged segregation laws, the Court focused on the
55. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
56. See id. at 490-92; see also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635-36
(1950) (holding that under the Equal Protection Clause, qualified black law
school applicant had personal right to legal education equivalent to that
offered by state to students of other races; educational opportunities offered
white and black law students by state were not substantially equal; and the Equal
Protection Clause required the admission of applicant to regular university law
school); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642
(1950) (holding that a black doctoral student who was admitted to a state-sup-
ported graduate school and assigned to a special seat reserved for blacks in the
classroom, library, and cafeteria was deprived of personal right to equal protec-
tion; and "under these circumstances the Fourteenth Amendment precludes
differences in treatment by the state based upon race"); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948) (holding the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the state to provide a qualified
black applicant with legal education afforded by state institution as soon as for
applicants of other groups and, where admission was denied solely because of
color, mandamus would lie to compel admission); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (holding the Equal Protection Clause
required state to afford black resident a substantially equal opportunity for a
legal education as the state did for white, regardless of whether other blacks
sought the same opportunity).
57. In Sweatt, the Supreme Court stated that although "[b]roader issues
have been urged for our consideration .. .we adhere to the principle of decid-
ing constitutional questions only in the context of the particular case before the
Court." Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631.
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fact that in each of the consolidated cases schools that were
clearly unequal were being equalized "with respect to buildings,
curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangi-
ble' factors."58 It determined, therefore, that its decision could
not turn on "these tangible factors in the Negro and white
schools involved in each of the cases" but must turn, instead, on
"the effect of segregation itself on public education." 9 Thus, the
Court asked whether there could be such a thing as intrinsic ine-
quality when tangible factors were equal and determined, on the
basis of expert psychological and sociological treatises evaluating
the general effects of segregation, that the separate-but-equal
doctrine had no place in public education. It concluded that
"the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions
have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained
of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment."6
Dworkin endorses the Brown decision as exemplifying the
moral reading of the Equal Protection Clause. Observing that the
case involved serious moral issues, he argues, "The Equal Protec-
tion Clause forbids legal constraints or institutions that can be
justified only on the ground that some citizens are inferior to
others, or that their fates are of less than equal concern, and
official racial segregation cannot be adequately justified on any
other"; therefore, racial segregation cannot be justified under
the Equal Protection Clause.61 Dworkin's argument is not, how-
ever, a purely rational argument from moral principle. Rather,
his claim that official racial segregation cannot be adequatelyjus-
tified on any basis other than inequality of the races presupposes
that the separate-but-equal doctrine logically entails unequal
treatment of the races, which may be an empirical inevitability
but is not a logical one. And, indeed, the evidence, not logic,
showed that, in practice, the separate-but-equal doctrine invaria-
bly entrained unequal treatment and unequal empirical conse-
quences, both tangible and intangible, for members of the
different races, including the plaintiffs.
Had the Court followed traditional jurisprudence in Brown,
it could have overruled the separate-but-equal doctrine on the
basis of the evidence of the effects of segregation upon the liti-
gants and the plain language and evolving case law interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause. The substantive "positive immunity,
58. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 495.
61. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 1732.
TWO CONCLPIONS OFJUDICIAL INTEGR1TY
or right... [of blacks] ... [to] exemption from legal discrimina-
tions, implying inferiority in civil society"62 was already there,
embedded in the language and purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause and recognized as such in case law as far back as The
Slaughter-House Cases and repeatedly after that in the Court's pub-
lic education cases. The evidence in Brown demonstrated that the
education the plaintiffs were receiving was not equal to that of
white children and was discriminatory in both tangibles and
intangibles."3 But the Court did not confine its ruling to the chal-
lenged laws and the facts of the case. Instead, it reasoned from
moral principle via expert opinion regarding the intangible
effects of segregation in general to the conclusion that segrega-
tion intrinsically violated the Equal Protection Clause, indepen-
dently establishing a fundamental substantive constitutional right
to racial equality that was violated by segregation, albeit, in this
case, a right and a violation that would also have been found by
traditional jurisprudential reasoning from precedent and fact.
The moral reading of the Constitution evinced in Brown had
profound repercussions for constitutional law, not merely
because it heralded the end of legal racial segregation in
America, but because it set Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence on a new course, one in which the Equal Protection
Clause would come to be seen as protecting from legal discrimi-
nation not only individuals and classes subjected to racial dis-
crimination expressly proscribed by the Constitution but also
other "unpopular" classes identified by the courts as entitled to
protection by the rational requirements of the abstract moral
concept of equality itself as understood by judges. But Brown's
substantive expansion of the Equal Protection Clause was not the
only linchpin in the turning of Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence from a traditionalist to a perfectionist construction.
VI. DUE PROCESS AND PERSONAL LIBERTY
Just as the moral reading of the Constitution holds that the
moral concept of equality in the Equal Protection Clause directly
implies a fundamental substantive right of non-discrimination
against judicially identifiable "suspect" or "target" classes, not
merely against racial classes traditionally held to be protected by
the Clause, so the moral reading also holds that the moral con-
cept of liberty in the Due Process Clause directly implies the con-
stitutional protection of judicially identifiable and enforceable
62. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879). See supra text
accompanying note 54.
63. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 486 n.1.
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fundamental substantive personal liberties not enumerated in
the Constitution. And, indeed, it is this latter conception of
moral substantive due process that has proved the most contro-
versial and divisive in modern rights-based jurisprudence.
A. Substantive Due Process and Personal Liberty
The jurisprudential concept of substantive due process is
not new. As is well known, it derives from the classic case of Loch-
ner vi. New York, decided in 1905.64 In Lochner, the Supreme Court
held, over vigorous dissents by Justice Holmes and the first Jus-
tice Harlan, that the right to contract was a fundamental per-
sonal liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause and
that this constitutionally protected interest must be balanced by
the Court against-and in that case outweighed-the State of
New York's right under its Tenth Amendment police power65 to
make laws relating to the public safety, health, morals, and gen-
eral welfare. The Lochner Court held that in every case in which
litigants seek constitutional protection for a right or liberty
asserted to invalidate a state law the Court must ask, "Is this a fair,
reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the
State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interfer-
ence with the right of the individual to his personal liberty...?""
The Supreme Court thus took to itself in Lochner the right to
determine independently whether substantive rights not enumer-
ated in the Constitution were nevertheless fundamental personal
liberties constitutionally protected against intrusion by the states,
and it imposed a judicial balancing test to determine whether a
personal liberty was infringed by state legislation, with the touch-
stone being the Court's own conception of fairness.
Although the Lochner Court insisted, "This is not a question
of substituting the judgment of the court for that of the legisla-
ture,"67justices Holmes and Harlan disagreed. The problem with
the majority opinion, according to the dissents, was that the "con-
stitutional" liberty of contract unpacked from the Due Process
Clause in that case was neither a personal liberty expressly pro-
tected by the Constitution, such as freedom of religion or of the
press, nor a personal liberty traditionally protected against state
64. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
65. See supra notes 38 and 41 for the text of the Tenth Amendment and
the definition of "police power."
66. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
67. Id. at 56-57.
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intrusion, but a personal liberty traditionally regulated in the
public interest.68
Justice Holmes opined that the Lochner case was "decided
upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does
not entertain," that "[g]eneral propositions do not decide con-
crete cases," and that
the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is per-
verted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and
fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed
would infringe fundamental principles as they have been
understood by the traditions of our people and our law.
69
Justice Harlan argued that even traditionally recognized funda-
mental personal liberties were "subject to such regulations as the
State may reasonably prescribe for the common good and the
well-being of society" and that the judiciary might declare such
regulations to be in excess of legislative authority only when "a
statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals or the public safety, has no real or sub-
stantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a
plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the [common] law,"
which it is the challenger's burden to prove.7" He would have
limited the power of the courts to review legislation "in respect of
a matter affecting the general welfare" only if the legislation had
"no real or substantial relation" to its stated objects."
B. Negative and Positive Personal Liberty
Although Lochner was repudiated by the 1930s, the ideas
found in Holmes's and Harlan's Lochner dissents did not die-
namely, that the Constitution protects from state intrusion those
non-enumerated personal liberties that have traditionally been
recognized as personal and fundamental, and that Congress and
the states may nevertheless regulate personal liberties when they
collectively and rationally deem it best for the common good.72
68. This dissenting view was later adopted by the Court. See Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934) (holding that contracts, although generally pro-
tected from governmental interference, are subject to regulation in the com-
mon interest).
69. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)).
71. Lochner, at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72. The concept had been recognized by the Supreme Court at least as
far back as Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (recognizing inherent
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In Meyer v. Nebraska, for example, the Supreme Court held
the requirement that no state shall deprive any person of liberty
without due process of law encompasses
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the com-
mon occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at com-
mon law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.7 3
Fourteen years later, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Court
held that the "liberty" safeguarded by the Due Process Clause is
liberty in social organization, which requires the protection of
law against evils menacing the health, safety, morals, and welfare
of the people; that this liberty implies the absence of arbitrary
restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibi-
tions imposed in the interests of the community; that questions
of wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of law are for legisla-
tures alone; and that, although the courts may hold inconsistent
views, a state law may not be annulled as unconstitutional unless
it is palpably in excess of legislative power.7 ' The part of Lochner
repudiated in West Coast was the Lochner majority's holding that
the Constitution protects from state regulation personal liberties
which the judiciary independently identifies as fundamental to
the concept of personal liberty but which the states traditionally
have regulated in the interest of the public as a whole.
Then, in a famous 1958 essay, "Two Concepts of Liberty,"
Isaiah Berlin reintroduced into mid-century Anglo-American
moral and political philosophy the two late eighteenth-century
philosophical concepts of "negative" and "positive" personal lib-
erty.7 5 "Negative" liberty refers to the right of individuals to make
rights to be free to use one's faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where
one wills, and "to pursue any livelihood or avocation" by all lawful means).
73. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
74. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937).
75. See BERLIN, supra note 1, at 203 (defining and contrasting the two con-
cepts of negative and positive liberty); Noel Annan, Forward to BERLIN, supra
note 1, at ix, xix; see also PHILIP PETrIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM
AND GOVERNMENT 17 (1997) ("Contemporary discussions of society and political
organization are dominated by a distinction which Isaiah Berlin made famous.
This is the distinction between what he, following a late-eighteenth-century tra-
dition, describes as negative and positive liberty."). Dworkin acknowledges the
centrality of Berlin's lecture to contemporary political philosophy. DwORKIN,
FREEDOM's LAw, supra note 5, at 21, 214; see also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra
note 26, at 825 (defining negative and positive liberty as constitutional terms).
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personal moral decisions free from state interference. It requires
that "a frontier must be drawn between the area of private life
and that of public authority," creating a zone of personal moral
freedom, or privacy, secured by the State against intrusion.76 It
thus comports in jurisprudence with Justices Holmes's and
Harlan's and subsequent case law's recognition of a fundamental
liberty interest in making private moral choices without govern-
mental intrusion, such as where to live, whom to marry, or how
to rear one's children.
The concept of "positive" personal liberty was, however, new
and different. It is an inalienable liberty of personal self-determi-
nation in accordance with the rational requirements of the con-
cept of personal liberty itself, and it is enforced equally for all by
the State.7 7 In Berlin's terms, positive liberty "consists in being
one's own master," i.e., in liberating oneself from the spiritual
slavery to one's lower self and identifying oneself with one's
"'real', or 'ideal', or 'autonomous' self, or with [one's] self 'at its
best.'"Y This higher self is associated with reason and identified
with the moral, or ideal, State, which exerts moral authority over
the lower, empirical self.79 Proponents of this philosophy view
"the real self ... as something wider than the individual ... as a
social 'whole' of which the individual is an element or aspect,"
and the social whole "is then identified as being the 'true' self
which, by imposing its collective, or 'organic,' single will upon its
recalcitrant 'members,' achieves its own, and therefore their,
'higher' freedom."' Public authority over personal liberty is
implied to assure that the "true" positive liberty of self-determina-
76. BERLIN, supra note 1, at 196.
77. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 5, at 21 (discussing Berlin's
essay).
78. BERLIN, supra note 1, at 203-04.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 204. This view reflects the thinking of Rousseau in which the
individual will is subsumed by the general will of society:
If, then, we take from the social pact everything which is not essential
to it, we shall find it to be reduced to the following terms: "each of us
contributes to the group his person and the powers which he wields as
a person under the supreme direction of the general will, and we
receive into the body politic each individual as forming an indivisible
part of the whole." As soon as the act of association becomes a reality,
it substitutes for the person of each of the contracting parties a moral
and collective body made up of as many members as the constituting
assembly has votes, which body receives from this very act of constitu-
tion its unity, its dispersed self and its will.
JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in SocIAL CON-
TRACT: EssAYs BY LOCKE, HUME & RoussEAu 167, 181 (Ernest Barker ed., Gerard
Hopkins trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1962). On this view, individual moral will is
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tion, i.e., the liberty of the individual to act in accordance with
the requirements of reason, is secured for all equally. As Berlin
explained it, because " [y] ou lack political liberty or freedom only
if you are prevented from attaining a goal by human beings," the
goal of the State that seeks to enforce positive liberty is to ensure
the "[e] quality of liberty" by requiring that you give up for your
fellow man that freedom in which he does not share equally.81
Thus, the concepts of liberty and equality merge at the level of
"true" abstract morality.
C. Two Conceptions of Positive Personal Liberty
Recognizing the nature of tyrannies, Berlin himself was
appalled by the concept of the State, as a thing apart from actual
people with license to identify and secure the "higher" or "true"
positive personal liberty for individual citizens in moral matters
against the will of the majority (insofar as the majority's "will" is
expressed by the State's law).82 But Dworkin embraces the con-
cept of positive individual liberty, or the liberty of self-determina-
absorbed into the general will-that is, the State may act on behalf of the peo-
ple, not as they direct, but as the rational requirements of liberty direct.
81. See BERLIN, supra note 1, at 194-97. This idea has gained great trac-
tion in contemporary American moral and political philosophy. See, e.g., RAWLS,
supra note 35, at 60 (positing the "liberty" principle and the "difference" princi-
ple, a variant of the principle of equality, as the determinative principles of a
just society, where the liberty principle is the principle that "each person is to
have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar
liberty for others"); see also PETTIT, supra note 75, at 8 (decrying democratic
republicanism "that represents the people in their collective presence as master
and the state as servant" and extolling the "commonwealth or republican posi-
tion [that] sees the people as trustor, both individually and collectively, and
sees the state as trustee: in particular, it sees the people as trusting the state to
ensure a dispensation of non-arbitrary rule").
82. Berlin states:
If the universe is governed by reason, then there will be no need for
coercion; a correctly planned life for all will coincide with full free-
dom-the freedom of rational self-direction-for all. This will be so if,
and only if, the plan is the true plan-the one unique pattern which
alone fulfils the claims of reason. Its laws will be the rules which reason
prescribes: they will only seem irksome to those whose reason is dor-
mant, who do not understand the true "needs" of their own "real"
selves. So long as each player recognizes [sic] and plays the part set
him by reason-the faculty that understands his true nature and dis-
cerns his true ends-there can be no conflict. Each man will be a lib-
erated, self-directed actor in the cosmic drama ....
The common assumption of these thinkers (and of many a
schoolman before them and Jacobin and Communist after them) is
that the rational ends of our "true" natures must coincide, or be made
to coincide, however violently our poor, ignorant, desire-ridden, pas-
sionate, empirical selves may cry out against this process. Freedom is
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tion, as a fundamental moral right implicit in the concept of
liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, and one whose
substantive implications the courts, as agents of the moral State,
are best suited to identify and enforce equally for all in accor-
dance with its rational implications. Dworkin contrasts this view
of positive liberty with the traditional view that the personal posi-
tive liberty of self-determination consists in the moral and politi-
cal right of the people to participate freely and equally in
governing themselves by majority vote, which Dworkin describes
as the "tyranny of the majority." 3 How, Dworkin asks, can the
individual be free when he is forced to bend to the will of the
majority? 4
In the idealist philosophy Berlin describes, and to which
Dworkin subscribes, "true" personal liberty is not individual lib-
erty in private matters, together with the liberty of each member
of society to participate freely and equally through his elected
representatives in defining the boundaries of personal freedom
for all. Rather, the liberty of moral self-determination remains
with each individual, and it is the duty of the courts-acting inde-
pendently of the common will in the exercise of their own best
judgment-to determine what the free and equal exercise of per-
sonal self-determination rationally requires and to protect that
fundamental liberty interest, thereby constraining the people's
right to actualize their own collective conception of the common
good in moral matters that affect them all in order to implement
the true rational conception of individual liberty.
In support of this view, Dworkin argues that when morality is
at issue, society's members should not be regarded as members
of an actual empirical political community in which each has an
equal vote-i.e., as persons equally entitled to contribute to the
public expression of the morality of the community through
their representatives-but instead as members of a "true" or
"genuine political community" that is "a community of indepen-
dent moral agents," each of whom has a right of self-determina-
tion in moral matters that is not amenable to co-option by the
laws made by the majority and is entitled to protection under a
superior law of personal moral freedom. 5
Dworkin reasons, "If true democracy is government by the
people, in the communal sense that provides self-government,
not freedom to do what is irrational, or stupid, or wrong. To force
empirical selves into the right pattern is not tyranny, but liberation.
BERLIN, supra note 1, at 218-19.
83. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 5, at 21.
84. Id. at 22.
85. See id. at 27.
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the true democracy is based on moral membership." 86 An actual
democracy is not a "true," or truly moral, democracy because
membership, i.e., the liberty of self-determination in matters of
morality, is accorded only to those who share the morality of the
majority and that collective liberty is "compromised when the
majority is prevented from securing its will."' 87 The collective lib-
erty of the actual majority to govern must, therefore, be con-
strained in order to protect the personal moral liberty of each
member of the moral community against the tyranny of the
moral majority.8 8 Accordingly, in matters of moral principle,
Dworkin urges rejection of the majoritarian premise that lies at
the heart of American democratic political theory, stating:
In some circumstances ... individual citizens may be able
to exercise the moral responsibilities of citizenship better
when final decisions are removed from ordinary politics
and assigned to courts, whose decisions are meant to turn
on principle, not on the weight of numbers or the balance
of political influence.
89
Because the legislature of an actual political democracy organ-
ized in terms of majority rule, like our own, will, by definition,
not take a hands-off approach to the assertion of a right to state
protection of non-traditional and non-enumerated individual
rights that, in the judgment of the majority, negatively impact the
health, safety, welfare, or morals of the whole, the political power
of the moral minority is best expressed by political pressure on
the courts. 90
Dworkin concedes that legislatures, as well as judges, may be
"guardians of principle too, and that includes constitutional prin-
86. Id. at 23.
87. Id.
88. The conception of the fundamental right of the individual to self-
assertion or self-determination as a constraint on the legitimate exercise of leg-
islative power by the whole owes a great deal to Rousseau. See supra note 80. It is
further developed in Mill's essay, On Liberty. SeeJOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY,
in UTILITARIANISM 126 (Mary Warnock ed., World Publ'g Co. 1962) (1859). In
that essay, Mill introduced the concept of "the tyranny of the majority" as
"among the evils against which society [is] require[d] to be on its guard." Id. at
129. He suggested, "There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective
opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it
against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs,
as protection against political despotism." Id. at 130.
89. DwoRKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 5, at 30-31.
90. See id. at 27 ("We do not want wealth to affect political decisions, but
that is because wealth is unequally and unfairly distributed. We certainly do
want influence to be unequal in politics for other reasons: we want those with
better views, or who can argue more cogently, to have more influence.").
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ciple."' But, he argues, "[w]e must set the majoritarian premise
aside, and with it the majoritarian conception of democracy"
because "[i] t is not a defensible conception of what true democ-
racy is, and it is not America's conception."' 2 "True" democracy
is democracy under conditions of rational personal moral liberty
and equality as determined by philosophers; and it is "true"
democracy, not the will of the majority of the actual members of
society as determined on a one-person/one-vote basis, that the
courts should enforce. This is, of course, an ideal whose realiza-
tion is beyond human compass. However, "the democratic condi-
tions set out in the Constitution are sufficiently met in practice so
that there is no unfairness in allowing national and local legisla-
tures the powers they have under standing arrangements." 3
Although Dworkin acknowledges that "democracy would be
extinguished by any general constitutional change that gave an
oligarchy of unelected experts power to overrule and replace any
legislative decision they thought unwise or unjust," he argues
that the situation is different when "the question is plausibly
raised whether some rule or regulation or policy itself undercuts
or weakens the democratic character of the community, and the
constitutional arrangement assigns that question to a court.""
Dworkin's challenge to the traditional conception of judicial
integrity as respect for the laws made by the people in accor-
dance with their own conception of the empirical boundaries
best placed on individual moral liberty for the good of the whole,
so long as those laws do not infringe a higher law in the hierar-
chy of positive laws, is stark.
On the traditional view, the members of society are free and
equal in truly private matters, and they have the inalienable
moral and political right-or positive liberty-to participate
equally in deciding moral issues that affect the whole for them-
selves through their elected representatives and to have their
votes aggregated impartially on the basis of the one-person/one-
vote principle and majority rule within constitutional constraints.
In such an actual democracy, the people do not surrender their
moral autonomy to an independent, unelected judiciary, acting
as "trustee" of their moral interests and empowered to determine
the good of the whole on their behalf in accordance with reason.
Rather, a free and equal people insist upon the right to elect
their own representatives and, through them, to determine for
91. Id. at 31.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 32.
94. Id.
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themselves collectively which personal liberties are beyond their
power to regulate, both by placing constitutional constraints on
their own collective power in the form of constitutionally enu-
merated personal rights that may not be infringed and by consti-
tutionally setting aside for themselves the power to define the
boundary between the legitimate exercise of state regulation for
the common good and governmental intrusion upon their fun-
damental personal liberties. Thus, in contrast to judges who read
the Constitution morally, the negative and positive liberties
enforceable by the courts on a traditional view are decided by the
people's own agreement, and only these agreed-upon rights are prop-
erly secured by the courts against contrary expressions of the
majority will.
From the traditionalist point of view, Dworkin errs in failing
to recognize or acknowledge that the individual exercise of
moral self-determination may affect other persons and institu-
tional arrangements with consequences far beyond those for the
persons asserting the liberty of self-determination. In other
words, Dworkin fails to situate the exercise of personal moral lib-
erty within the empirical moral nexus that governs practical
moral and legal judgments and fails to recognize that personal
moral decisions may affect the common good. By affirming the
right of individuals to determine their own personal morality on
issues that affect other people and institutions without consider-
ing the impact on the whole, judges who adopt Dworkin's theory
of the courts as the arbiters of constitutionally protected positive
personal liberties necessarily deny the liberty of the people to set
the limits of their own personal moral freedom collectively on
matters that affect them all. In its place, they license individual
moral liberty bound only by a judicial determination that the lib-
erty licensed is implicit in the concept of liberty itself-which is
no boundary at all, since the abstract concept of personal liberty
necessarily implies all substantive personal moral liberties.
"True" democracy, as Dworkin describes it, which the courts
enforce as arbiters of the conditions of liberty, rather than leav-
ing it to the people to determine the limits of their own collective
freedom on a free and equal basis, is the antithesis of actual
democracy in that it does not incorporate respect for the original
moral and political right on which the American government was
founded-the right of the people themselves to make through
their elected representatives those laws for their own governance
that they believe most conducive to the good of all. Rather,
"democracy" is the philosophic projection of how people would
vote if "true" democratic conditions were realized, i.e., if they
were all ideally equal, free, and rational participants in structur-
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ing an ideal state in accordance with "true" moral propositions.
And the moral and political duty of judges is to identify and
enforce the "true" conditions of moral freedom denied by the
collective will of the actual majority. On this view, the integrity of
the law is not preserved by the interpretation of the positive law
by judges bound by the strict rules and precedents in the positive
law; rather, the truly moral law is whatjudges bound only by their
own "best" judgment say it is.
Dworkin acknowledges that his theory lacks a "positive argu-
ment in favor ofjudicial review, either in the form that institution
has taken in the United States or in any other form," as the best
means of maintaining democracy once the intellectual underpin-
nings of majoritarianism have, as he believes, been demolished. 5
He, therefore, ends his argument by asking, "What shall we say
about the remaining questions, the institutional questions the
moral reading does not reach?"96 That is, how do "we" restruc-
ture society to attain the true democratic conditions necessary to
the moral state? His solution:
I see no alternative but to use a result-driven rather than a
procedure-driven standard for deciding them. The best
institutional structure is the one best calculated to produce
the best answers to the essentially moral question of what
the democratic conditions actually are, and to secure stable
compliance with those conditions.
97'
In other words, where the end is the creation of a truly
moral society-a just society-the end justifies whatever means it
takes to secure stable compliance with the dictates of moral rea-
son. Since the United States is an actual political democracy, and
not an ideal one, however, its positive law reflects only the tyr-
anny of the majority, which must be jettisoned to protect the val-
ues of the true democracy of a moral community that realizes the
higher self of the people and whose conditions it is the duty of
judges of integrity to discern and enforce. True democracy, like
true liberty and equality, is, on this view, too precious to be
entrusted to the people.
Nevertheless, because we have no institutions that can infal-
libly assure the morality of the positive law, Dworkin argues that,
given the institutional structure of government we actually have,
there is no reason to resist the "straightforward interpretation of
American constitutional practice [which] shows that our judges
have final interpretive authority, and that they largely under-
95. Id. at 33.
96. Id. at 34.
97. Id.
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stand the Bill of Rights as a constitution of principle"98 and,
therefore, have the authority (and, as judges of integrity, the
duty) to correct for moral injustice in the positive law. Dworkin
thus advocates a result-driven judiciary with license to interpret
the law by identifying in the moral concepts of liberty and equal-
ity in the Fourteenth Amendment and enforcing whatever sub-
stantive personal rights or liberties a majority of judges on a
panel or court believe in their best independent judgment are
necessary to establish the true democratic conditions of a just
society (with no account being taken of differing moral views
among the judiciary itself). By redefining democracy-and defin-
ing out of the collective moral whole anyone who disagrees with
the majority's moral pronouncements and placing their protec-
tion in the hands of courts bound only by the independent moral
judgment of their majorities-Dworkin necessarily comes to a
conception of social and judicial moral integrity that directly
opposes the traditional American conception.
For the reasons set forth above, I believe Dworkin's argu-
ment rests on false assumptions, namely that neither the demo-
cratic structure of American government nor its positive law is
"truly" moral; that actual democracy does not protect true equal-
ity or true personal liberty; and that traditional jurisprudence
does not preserve the systemic morality of the positive law
because there is no systemic morality in the positive law to pre-
serve. Nevertheless, the conception of the courts-particularly
the Supreme Court-as the final authority in saying what the
principles of equality and personal liberty, both negative and
positive, morally require has been a dominant force in Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence for the last half-century.
VII. THE PERFECTIONIST CONSTRUCTION
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY
A. Poe v. Ullman
The modern conception of a zone of privacy, or negative
freedom from governmental intrusion into personal moral deci-
sion making, entered the modern Supreme Court's due process
jurisprudence with the second Justice Harlan's famous dissent in
Poe v. Ullman,99 decided three years after the publication of Ber-
lin's essay on liberty. Poe denied review of a Connecticut law
prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of
98. Id. at 35.
99. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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medical advice as to their use,"°° which the Supreme Court
would invalidate four years later in Griswold v. Connecticut."°'
Addressing the plaintiffs' asserted right to marital privacy, Justice
Harlan opined that the power of the State to act is limited by a
concept of "privacy that is implicit in a free society" and that
"emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under
which we live."10 2 If the State invades that zone of privacy, it acts
unconstitutionally. Included within this sphere is "the privacy of
the home" including "marital intimacy." 103
Justice Harlan also recognized, however, that the zone of
personal liberty had traditionally been circumscribed by the will
of the majority in a social context and that these societal limita-
tions, when long held and essential to the concept of ordered
liberty, were themselves of fundamental status. Thus, he opined,
society has a right to enact "laws regarding marriage which pro-
vide both when the sexual powers may be used and the legal and
societal context in which children are born and brought up" and
a corresponding right to enact laws forbidding sexual practices
that contradict the proposition of confining sexuality to mar-
riage."' Harlan further pointed out that "always and in every
age" society has exercised its right to decide who may marry and
when the sexual powers may and may not be used to foster and
protect marriage. 10 5 In other words, Justice Harlan's Poe dissent
recognized both a negative liberty interest, or zone of privacy, in
which personal moral decision making is protected from govern-
mental intrusion, and the constitutional right of the people to
enact laws that constrain personal moral self-determination when
they rationally deem it best in order to further the common
good. He thus recapitulated the insights into the concept of per-
sonal liberty evinced by the first Justice Harlan and by Justice
100. Id. at 509.
101. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
102. Poe, 367 U.S. at 521. Cf BERLIN, supra note 1, at 198 (describing neg-
ative liberty as "reserving a large area for private life over which neither the
State nor any other authority must be allowed to trespass").
103. Poe, 367 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 546.
105. Id. at 552-53. Justice Harlan stated:
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the
State forbids altogether, but the intimacy of husband and wife is neces-
sarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage,
an institution which the State not only must allow, but which always
and in every age it has fostered and protected.
Id. at 553.
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Holmes in their Lochner dissents and carried forward in Meyer and
Parrish. 1
0 6
Justice Harlan did not, however, endorse the notion that the
Constitution also guarantees a fundamental right of positive per-
sonal liberty, or self-determination, whose substantive attributes
are subject to independent identification and enforcement by
the courts as constraints on the exercise of the police power of
the states; nor had this concept of liberty been historically
approved in American jurisprudence, other than in the Lochner
majority opinion and its progeny, when Poe was decided. Never-
theless, when the concept of the courts as the protectors of
unenumerated individual personal liberties under the Due Pro-
cess Clause entered modem Supreme Court jurisprudence in
Griswold,1"7 four years after Poe, it was not confined to the recog-
nition of the courts as protectors of privacy or of positive liberties
long deemed essential to ordered liberty, such as the right to
marry with rational limits imposed by the State. It was accompa-
nied by the revival of the concept of the courts as protectors of
positive liberties they independently deem implied by the con-
cept of liberty itself, even if opposed by the majority of the peo-
ple, i.e., it was accompanied by the revival of substantive due
process.
B. Griswold v. Connecticut
The Supreme Court held in Griswold that "specific guaran-
tees in the Bill of Rights have penumbra, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. '"108
Thus, the Constitution protects not only enumerated substantive
rights but also a "zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees,"'0 9 within which the Court identified a
"basic and fundamental" right of privacy in marriage.110 Recog-
nizing that this right of marital privacy could be construed as a
substantive due process right derived directly from the abstract
concept of personal liberty, the Court distinguished Lochner, stat-
ing (in language eerily similar to that of the majority in Lochner),
"We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom,
need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, busi-
ness affairs, or social conditions. This law, however, operates
directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their
106. See supra text accompanying notes 67-74.
107. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
108. Id. at 484.
109. Id. at 485.
110. Id. at 490 (Goldberg,J., concurring).
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physician's role in one aspect of that relation.""' The Court's
statement can be read, of course, not as disavowing Lochner, but
as justifying substantive due process when the question is a moral
one as opposed to an economic one."
2
That two different concepts of personal liberty were at issue
in Griswold-the concept of negative liberty, or privacy, and that
of positive liberty, or a fundamental right to state protection of
individual self-determination in moral matters-was recognized
immediately, if inchoately, by the concurring justices, Goldberg
and Harlan. Justice Goldberg would have held that "the Due Pro-
cess Clause protects those liberties that are 'so rooted in the tra-
ditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental,""'11 including rights "which exist alongside those
fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the [Bill of
Rights].""14 He would thus have found that the right of privacy,
that is, "'the right to be let alone,"' including, in particular, "the
right 'to marry, establish a home and bring up children' was an
essential part of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment."" 5 However, he did not believe that judges were
empowered to decide cases "in light of their personal and private
notions" when determining which rights were fundamental;
rather, they must look to the deeply rooted "'traditions and (col-
lective) conscience of our people"' to determine whether a right
is such "that it cannot be denied without violating those 'funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
111. Id. at 482 (majority opinion). For the language from Lochner, see
supra text accompanying note 66.
112. While a "right of marital privacy" can be understood as a tradition-
ally protected personal liberty, the Court would later describe this same right
more expansively as "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child"-that is, as a
fundamental "reproductive right." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
In Lawrence v. Texas, this same fundamental right would be expanded in
another direction as "the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual con-
duct [that] extends beyond the marital relationship." 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003).
Eisenstadt and Lawrence are discussed infra Sections VII.C and VII.F, respectively.
Dworkin refers to the correlative moral principle for this right as "the principle
of procreative autonomy." DWORMN, FIREDOM's LAW, supra note 5, at 102.
113. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
114. Id. at 488.
115. Id. at 494-95 (citations omitted). Justice Black, on the other hand,
would not have recognized a constitutionally protected zone of privacy. See id. at
510 (Black, J., dissenting) ("I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am
nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.").
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civil and political institutions' " 16 and thus can be invaded by the
State only to protect a compelling state interest.1 17 Justice
Harlan, likewise, thought the proper constitutional inquiry was
whether the statute at issue violated "basic values 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,'"118 which he believed the Four-
teenth Amendment protected generally, but he did not interpret
the rights protected by the Amendment as restricted to those
identified by judges as "assured by the letter or penumbra of the
Bill of Rights." '19
In sum, the concurring justices would have interpreted the
Due Process Clause as requiring that the State respect both per-
sonal privacy, or negative liberty, and the fundamental positive
liberties traditionally defined and protected by the positive law.
They did not, however, interpret the Constitution as permitting
the courts independently to identify and enforce as constitution-
ally protected rights substantive personal liberties deemed to
"emanate" from constitutionally enumerated rights or to be
rationally implied by the concept of liberty itself, such as a right
of marital privacy.
C. Eisenstadt v. Baird
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, decided in 1972, the Supreme Court
extended the fundamental substantive liberty it had identified in
Griswold by invalidating a law that prohibited the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons.' 20 Although the case was
decided under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court went on to
state that the fundamental right of privacy identified in Griswold
was "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.' 2' The Court thus added an additional, non-tradi-
tional substantive gloss to the concept of constitutionally pro-
tected sexual and reproductive rights-the right of both married
and single people to "bear and beget" children without "unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion" as independently determined by
the courts.
116. Id. at 492-95 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 497-98.
118. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
119. Id. at 499.
120. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972).
121. Id. at 453.
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D. Roe v. Wade
In the abortion rights cases, beginning with Roe v. Wade12 2 in
1973, the Supreme Court made its most dramatic statement of
fundamental sexual and reproductive rights. Roe has been both
applauded and blamed for judicially resolving the debate of the
American people regarding a woman's right to an abortion, and
it has been the subject of repeated attempts by legislatures,
including the United States Congress, to probe its scope and cir-
cumvent its strictures ever since. Roe is much more complex than
the cases that are the focus of this paper because it involves direct
questions not only of individual moral self-determination and the
limits of legislative power to regulate "a woman's right to her own
body," but also questions of the existence or non-existence, rele-
vance, and inter-relationship of the legal and moral rights of
mother, father, fetus, and state. Thus, a thorough examination of
Roe and its progeny would swamp this paper, and I cite it solely
for its place in the evolution of the moral reading of the
Constitution.
The Supreme Court began the opinion by acknowledging
"the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy"
and of the "vigorous opposing views" abortion generated
depending on "[o]ne's philosophy, one's experiences, one's
exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious
training, one's attitudes toward life and family and their values,
and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe."'
123
The plaintiff asked the Supreme Court to "discover" a right of a
pregnant woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy "in the
concept of personal 'liberty' embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital, famil-
ial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or
its penumbras; or among those rights reserved to the people by
the Ninth Amendment."' 24 The Court surveyed the history of
criminal abortion laws and determined them to be of recent stat-
utory vintage, "effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the
19th century. "125 It then argued that the historical social and
medical reasons advanced to justify such statutes had disap-
peared, but it determined that, in assessing the third interest
advanced to justify abortion statutes,-"the State's interest ... in
protecting prenatal life"-"recognition may be given to the ...
claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State
122. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
123. Id. at 116.
124. Id. at 129 (citations omitted).
125. Id.
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may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant
woman alone."'
126
The Court's legal argument was succinct. It observed that,
"[t] he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of pri-
vacy," but that a line of Supreme Court decisions had "recog-
nized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.' ' 127 It
concluded,
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the Dis-
trict Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reser-
vation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy.'
28
It determined, however, that the right was not absolute; rather,
"It]he Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also
acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by
that right is appropriate." 129 Therefore, "this right is not unquali-
fied and must be considered against important state interests in
regulation." "10
The Court then considered lower court decisions and deter-
mined that some had invalidated state abortion statutes as vague
or overbroad, while others had sustained them, but "[a]lthough
the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the
right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the
abortion decision."' Agreeing with this approach, it held that
where such "'fundamental rights' are involved.., regulation lim-
iting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state
interest.'"132 The Court rejected the argument that the term
"person" had a "pre-natal application" entitling the unborn to
Fourteenth Amendment protection.' 3 However, it found it "rea-
sonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point
in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of
potential human life, becomes significantly involved" so "[t]he
woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she
126. Id. at 150.
127. Id. at 152 (citing cases).
128. Id. at 153.
129. Id. at 153-54.
130. Id. at 154.
131. Id. at 155.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 157-58.
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possesses must be measured accordingly."1"4 The Court rejected
the argument that the State's interest in protecting pre-natal life
began at conception. Rather, it stated, "the 'compelling' point, in
the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the
end of the first trimester," because of "the now-established medi-
cal fact ... that until the end of the first trimester mortality in
abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth.""13
Thus, "from and after this point, a State may regulate the abor-
tion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably
relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health."
' 36
Prior to this "'compelling' point," the State may not interfere
with a woman's right to choose an abortion or a physician's right
to terminate a pregnancy."3 7 The "compelling" point for "the
State's important and legitimate interest in potential life," how-
ever, is viability, after which point the State "may go so far as to
proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is neces-
sary to preserve the life or health of the mother."
1 38
Regardless of one's approbation or disapprobation of the
Roe decision, this was a ground-breaking decision in terms of the
Supreme Court's assertion of a well-defined fundamental per-
sonal right that lacked ancient historical roots among rights
secured to the American people; that directly and indirectly
intersected the interpersonal moral and legal rights of others,
including spouses and, it was unsuccessfully argued, the unborn
fetus; and that specified in detail to what extent states had the
police power to regulate the public health, safety, welfare, and
morals of those seeking abortions.
Not only did Roe establish a fundamental substantive due
process right to an abortion, it both recognized the comprehen-
sive effect of its ruling and specifically defined the scope of state
power to regulate abortions, relying upon the decisions of lower
courts and its own independent determination of when legally
protected human life begins. There is thus no question that Roe
is a landmark case evincing the moral reading of the Constitu-
tion. Nor is there any question that it has generated legislative
resistance that continues to the present day.
134. Id. at 159.
135. Id. at 163.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 163-64.
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E. Romer v. Evans
The constitutional protection judicially afforded to sexual
freedom was further expanded by the Supreme Court in 1996 in
Romer v. Evans.1 39 Romer, like Eisenstadt, involved an Equal Protec-
tion, rather than a Due Process, challenge to a state constitu-
tional amendment adopted by the Colorado voters in a statewide
referendum, partly in response to ordinances passed in some
Colorado municipalities banning discrimination against homo-
sexuals in various transactions and activities. The amendment
repealed those local laws to the extent they accorded protected
status based on "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships," and it prohibited govern-
mental action that entitled "any person or class of persons to
have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected
status or claim of discrimination."
140
The State of Colorado argued that homosexuals were not a
constitutionally protected class and that Amendment 2 was
grounded in respect for other citizens' constitutional right to
freedom of association "and in particular the liberties of land-
lords or employers who have personal or religious objections to
homosexuality.""1 4 While acknowledging that homosexuals were
not a protected class and that "the Fourteenth Amendment did
not give Congress a general power to prohibit discrimination in
public accommodations,"1 4 2 the Supreme Court observed that
some states, including Colorado, had countered discrimination
"by enacting detailed statutory schemes" that "depart from the
common law by enumerating the groups or persons within their
ambit of protection," thus making concrete the general "duty not
to discriminate.""14 It further observed, "Colorado's state and
local governments [had] not limited antidiscrimination laws to
groups that have so far been given the protection of heightened
equal protection scrutiny under our cases."' 44 Thus the Court
139. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
140. Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b)). Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Thomas and ChiefJustice Rehnquist, dissented. The majority
read the amendment as banning "claim [s] of discrimination" by homosexuals
and laws "designed to protect" homosexuals. Id. Justice Scalia read it as prevent-
ing only "preferential treatment" of homosexuals. Id. at 638-39 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
141. Id. at 635 (majority opinion).
142. Id. at 627-28 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)).
The Fourteenth Amendment does, however, give Congress-and not the
courts-the power to enforce equal protection by appropriate legislation. U.S.
CONsT. amend XIV, § 5.
143. Romer, 517 U.S. at 628.
144. Id. at 628-29 (emphasis added).
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implied that, even though the Constitution did not recognize a
broad, general "duty not to discriminate" against, or "target,"
morally "unpopular" classes, the enumeration of group rights in
state ordinances and statutes was a process that by itself could
generate such constitutional group rights.
The Court did not, however, declare homosexuals a pro-
tected class or declare homosexual conduct a fundamental con-
stitutional right implicit in the moral concept of equality or
liberty. Instead, it held that Amendment 2 failed to satisfy the
rational basis test because it imposed "a broad and undifferenti-
ated disability on a single named group," which the Court held to
be an "invalid form of legislation," even as it recognized the
"practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one pur-
pose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or
persons."
145
The rational basis test, as the Court recognized, merely
requires that a state law bear a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate state purpose. 4 6 Thus, that test, traditionally applied,
would have required the Court to determine whether Colorado
had a rational basis for enforcing the constitutional right of asso-
ciation by generally forbidding claims of "minority status ....
protected status or claim of discrimination"' 47 by homosexuals,
and the amendment might have been held invalid under that
test. But while the Court invoked the rational basis test, it went
far beyond that test and made a moral judgment that Amend-
ment 2 was not "directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose
or discrete objective" '148 because its real purpose was to "classif[y]
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make
them unequal to everyone else."' 49 The Court then opined that
"its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for
it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but ani-
mus toward the class it affects."15
The Romer decision represents a significant departure from
traditional jurisprudence in several respects. First, declaring it an
illegitimate state purpose to "target" a morally "unpopular"
group for legal discrimination "with resulting disadvantage" to
145. Id. at 631-32.
146. Id. at 632 ("In the ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it can be
said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise
or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it
seems tenuous.").
147. Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b)).
148. Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 632.
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the group defies the reality of law, as the Court itself acknowl-
edged Sa-and not only the reality of law but the nature of prac-
tical, empirical judgment itself. It can hardly be illegitimate for
states to identify and target for discrimination the moral class of
sadists, sado-masochists, pornographers, child predators, rapists,
killers, check forgers, or even trespassers in their capacity as
such. The Romer Court, however, read the concept of liberty in
the Constitution as rationally implying the illegitimacy of discrim-
ination against homosexuals based on its own determination that
the Constitution forbids "animus" against moral minorities, i.e.,
it read the Constitution morally.
Second, the Romer Court reasoned that fundamental constitu-
tional duties and rights are changed by changing trends in the
laws enacted by state legislatures and subordinate local bodies, 52
rather than reasoning that local ordinances and state laws are to
be tested against a fair reading of the language of the Constitu-
tion and controlling precedent. From a traditional legal perspec-
tive, this is backwards reasoning. On this understanding of an
"evolving Constitution," the Constitution has no meaning of its
own but such as the courts derive from current local rules and
subordinate laws they favor or from any other sources that sup-
port the best constructive view of the rational requirements of
personal liberty. Romer's recognition of an emerging fundamen-
tal constitutional right of morally "unpopular" classes not to be
discriminated against (which overrides the constitutionally-enu-
merated right of freedom of association) thus defies the constitu-
tional procedures for both the legislative creation of substantive
rights and the creation of new constitutional rights through pro-
cedures set out in Article V of the Constitution.15 Romer's asser-
151. See id. at 631-32 (recognizing the "practical necessity that most legis-
lation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to vari-
ous groups or persons"); cf id. at 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Court's reading of equal protection "is proved false every time a state law
prohibiting or disfavoring certain conduct is passed").
152. See id. at 628 (majority opinion) ("Colorado's state and municipal
laws typify this emerging tradition of statutory protection and follow a consis-
tent pattern. The laws first enumerate the persons or entities subject to a duty
not to discriminate. The list goes well beyond... the common law."). Not only
are these laws broad, but they "also depart from the common law by enumerat-
ing the groups or persons within their ambit of protection. Enumeration is the
essential device used to make the duty not to discriminate concrete and to pro-
vide guidance for those who must comply." Id.
153. Article V provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it nec-
essary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case,
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tion of the authority of judges to derive a fundamental,
substantive constitutional right of moral non-discrimination (or
the constitutional illegitimacy of moral discrimination) directly
from their own independent assessment of the moral require-
ments of equality and to decide legal cases and invalidate general
laws on the basis of those rights follows directly from the moral
reading of the Constitution.
Finally, there is no support either in the language of the
Constitution or in precedent for the Supreme Court's conclu-
sions in Romer that the enforcement of the morality of the people
is per se an illegitimate state purpose. Rather, the protection of
community morality is not only a traditional function of govern-
ment but also one constitutionally recognized as belonging to
the states under the police power conferred on them by the
Tenth Amendment and on Congress by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, limited only by the enumerated rights in the Constitution
and the constitutionally protected zone of privacy.
Thus, while the law at issue in Romer could have been invali-
dated by a traditional court on the basis of the lack of a rational
relation between the sweeping law and its professed objectives, it
could not have been invalidated by such a court on the grounds
stated in the Romer opinion. The Romer Court's argument and
conclusion are, however, compatible with Dworkin's arguments
that a "true" democracy is a moral community in which each
member-and, by extension, each moral class-has an inaliena-
ble right to self-determination that is infringed whenever that
person's or class's moral self-expression is "targeted" by the
majority for discrimination and that judicial integrity requires
that the moral majority be prohibited from infringing individual
moral liberty.
F. Lawrence v. Texas
In Lawrence v. Texas, decided in 2003, seven years after
Romer, the Supreme Court extended the departures from tradi-
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution,
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States,
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress ....
U.S. CONST. art. V. No power of the judiciary to recognize and implement
emerging constitutional rights was recognized in 1972, when feminists sought
passage of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution, which
has yet to be approved by the necessary thirty-eight states. See Roberta W. Fran-
cis, The History Behind the Equal Rights Amendment, http://www.equalrights
amendment.org/era.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
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tional constitutional reasoning evinced in Romer.154 In Lawrence,
the Court turned from the Equal Protection Clause to find in the
"broad statements of the substantive reach of liberty under the
Due Process Clause"1 55 a fundamental substantive right of con-
senting adults to "engage[ ] in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle . . .without intervention of the govern-
ment. ' 156 Relying on the line of cases following from Gris-
woldS'V-cases which the Court credited with establishing that
"the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct
extends beyond the marital relationship" 15 8 -the Court held that
"the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a
substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining
the rights of the person," a dimension broad enough to encom-
pass the substantive right to choose homosexual conduct.
15 9
Thus, the Texas law at issue, which penalized homosexual sod-
omy, like the state constitutional amendment at issue in
Romer, furthered "no legitimate state interest " "' and was
unconstitutional.
The Court concentrated the bulk of its argument in Lawrence
on overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, which had upheld a similar
Georgia statute seventeen years earlier. 16' Again, as in Romer, the
154. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
155. Id. at 564.
156. Id. at 578. Only Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment,
based her opinion on the Equal Protection Clause, stating, "Moral disapproval
of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because legal classifications must not be 'drawn for the purpose
of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.'" Id. at 583 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). As in Romer,
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and ChiefJustice Rehnquist, dissented.
157. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
158. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565. For a comparison of a case where the
court struck down an anti-contraceptive law based on how it affected conjugal
sexual-privacy rights, see supra Section VII.B regarding Griswold.
159. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565-67.
160. Id. at 578.
161. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, decided in 1986,
the Supreme Court had held that the Due Process Clause did not confer a
fundamental right of sexual freedom on homosexuals to engage in sodomy and
that, therefore, Georgia's sodomy statute was not unconstitutional. The Court
opined that it had "sought to identify the nature of the rights qualifying for
heightened judicial protection," including "those fundamental liberties that are
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty norjustice
would exist if [they] were sacrificed," Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (alteration in
original) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)), and
those liberties that are "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'"
Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(Powell, J., plurality opinion)). However, "neither of these formulations would
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Court supported its decision by recourse to "emerging" moral
standards as reflected in an increasing number of states' invalida-
tion of their sodomy laws.' 6 2 But it found the principal support
for its decision in foreign law, repudiating what the Court called
"sweeping references" by Chief Justice Burger in Bowers "to the
history of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and
ethical standards."' 6 3 The Court stated that Bowers "did not take
account of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction"-
namely the British Parliament's repeal of sodomy laws and the
European Court of Human Rights' decision in a case similar to
Bowers. 6 ' The Lawrence Court added, "To the extent Bowers relied
on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted
that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected
elsewhere."65
Although the Lawrence Court stated that the doctrine of stare
decisis, or reliance on precedent to maintain uniformity, "is
essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court
extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual
sodomy" since "[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots." Id.
After reciting a historical list of anti-sodomy statutes, the Court opined that it
was not "inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new
fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause" because "[t] he Court
is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-
made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution." Id. at 194.
Justice Blackmun, however, dissented in Bowers from the Court's refusal to
recognize "the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the
nature of their intimate associations with others." Id. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). He would have held that "the presumed belief of a majority of the
electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable"
was nothing more than "religious intolerance" that provided no rational basis
for the state sodomy law at issue. Id. at 196, 211-12. He opined, "No matter how
uncomfortable a certain group may make the majority of this Court, we have
held that '[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionallyjustify
the deprivation of a person's physical liberty."' Id. at 212 (quoting O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)). Justice Stevens, too, expressed the view
that the liberty interest of the individual in making "certain unusually impor-
tant decisions that will affect his own, or his family's, destiny" implicates "funda-
mental" basic values that trump the right of the people as a whole to make laws
they deem best to further the common interests of the whole. Id. at 217 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (quoting his own majority opinion in Fitzgerald v. Porter
Mem'l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975)). Thus both dissenters
argued in favor of reading the Due Process Clause morally.
162. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. At the time of Bowers, twenty-four states
and the District of Columbia still had such laws. By the time Lawrence was
decided, twelve more states had repealed their sodomy laws.
163. Id. at 572.
164. Id. at 572-73.
165. Id. at 576.
2008]
282 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 22
and to the stability of the law," it found stare decisis to not be "an
inexorable command." '66 Rather, it stated:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment
known the components of liberty in its manifold possibili-
ties, they might have been more specific. They did not pre-
sume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to
certain truths and later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.
As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation
can invoke its principles in their own search for greater
freedom.
1 67
The Court defined the issue in Lawrence as "whether the
majority may use the power of the State to enforce these [moral]
views on the whole society through operation of the criminal
law,"168 and it opined, "'Our obligation is to define the liberty of
all, not to mandate our own moral code."' 169 In fact, however,
the Court did mandate for all its own independent conception of
constitutionally protected sexual liberty, relying on "the substan-
tive reach of liberty" 17° it discerned directly in the Fourteenth
Amendment and on its independent appreciation of values wider
than those in American law. In doing so, the Court made clear
that attempts by the majority of the people "to enforce [its own]
views on the whole society"17' by making laws that deny judicially-
identified fundamental personal liberties are illegitimate abuses
of power that are trumped by the Court's own right to "define
the liberty of all" 172 and "to say what the law is. "173
The Lawrence opinion's understanding of the judiciary's
power "to say what the law is" is, however, fundamentally at odds
with the understanding of that famous phrase by its author, Chief
Justice Marshall, 174 and by the Framers, like Hamilton, who
166. Id. at 577.
167. Id. at 578-79.
168. Id. at 571.
169. Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 850 (1992)).
170. Id. at 564.
171. Id. at 571.
172. Id. at 559.
173. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
174. Chief Justice Marshall opined in Marbury:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is....
[I]f both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case,
so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, dis-
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viewed judges as interpreters of the law who, "[t]o avoid an arbi-
trary discretion," were to be "bound down by strict rules and
precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in
every particular case that comes before them."'75 Instead, it com-
ports with Dworkin's conception of judicial integrity as the duty
ofjudges "to declare ... what the basic liberties really are," and
thus independently to "answer intractable, controversial, and
profound questions of political morality"'1 76 and to make their
answers binding on society.
G. Roper v. Simmons
Roper v. Simmons, in 2005, advanced the moral reading of the
Constitution in a new direction. 177 I include it, even though it
was decided primarily under the Eighth Amendment, not the
Fourteenth, because it expands the concept of substantive due
process beyond sexual and reproductive rights and because it
illustrates Dworkin's contention that when the Constitution is
read morally, enumerated constitutional rights collapse into
moral concepts of liberty and equality of "near[ly] limitless
abstraction" that should guide principled legal judgment.
78
Again abjuring traditional legal argument, the Supreme
Court held in Roper that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
bar capital punishment for persons who commit their crimes
regarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflict-
ing rules governs the case. This is of the very essence ofjudicial duty.
Id. at 177-78. Justice Marshall also opined that "the framers of the constitution
contemplated that instrument[ ] as a rule for the government of courts, as well
as of the legislature," and that "courts, as well as other departments, are bound
by that instrument." Id. at 179-80. In both instances it is clear from the context
that Marshall did not foresee the claim that the courts are absolutely free to
determine the "true" content of the Constitution without reference to the rules
and precedents in the positive law.
175. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 42, at 471;
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 42, at 497
(" [T] he judicial authority of the federal judicatures is declared by the Constitu-
tion to comprehend certain cases particularly specified. The expression of
those cases marks the precise limits beyond which the federal courts cannot
extend their jurisdiction, because the objects of their cognizance being enu-
merated, the specification would be nugatory if it did not exclude all ideas of
more extensive authority."). Hamilton also stated, "The rules of legal interpre-
tation are rules of common sense, adopted by the courts in the construction of the
laws. The true test, therefore, of a just application of them is its conformity to
the source from which they are derived." Id. at 496.
176. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 5, at 74.
177. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
178. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 5, at 73.
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before the age of eighteen. 79 After a gruesome recitation of the
facts of the murder for which Simmons had been convicted and
condemned to death, and references to two prior opinions in
which the Court had relied on "'evolving standards of
decency "'0 to determine whether juvenile offenders could be
sentenced to death, 1 ' the Court stated its method for deciding
the case:
The beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consen-
sus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legisla-
tures that have addressed the question. This data gives us
essential instruction. We then must determine, in the exer-
cise of our own independent judgment, whether the death pen-
alty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.' 82
Even more forcefully than Lawrence, Roper announces judicial
independence from traditional American jurisprudence. By the
Court's own pronouncement, judges are free to determine the
meaning of the Constitution by their own independent "review
of objective indicia of consensus,""8 3 rather than being bound by
either precedent or rule.
As in Romer and Lawrence, the Court looked to "evolving"
state law, foreign law, and expert opinion to support its judg-
ment." 4 The Roper Court found thirty states had rejected the
179. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
180. Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plu-
rality opinion)).
181. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (barring execution
of offenders under age sixteen at time crime committed); Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding execution of offenders between ages of sixteen
and eighteen at time crime committed), overruled by Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
182. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added).
183. Id.
184. By contrast, the Court had followed the traditional standard of
review for determining whether punishment was "cruel and unusual" under the
Eighth Amendment in Stanford v. Kentucky, in which it had upheld the death
penalty for persons between the ages of sixteen and eighteen. The Court stated
in Stanford, "In determining what standards have 'evolved,' . .. we have looked
not to our own conceptions of decency, but to those of modern American soci-
ety as a whole." Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369. Thus, "'first' among the 'objective
indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction' are statutes
passed by society's elected representatives." Id. at 370 (quoting Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). The Court found in Stanford petitioners had
failed to carry their "heavy burden" of proof that standards had so evolved as to
render the death penalty for minors cruel and unusual. Id. at 373. The Court
also warned that to say
it is for us to judge, not on the basis of what we perceive the Eighth
Amendment originally prohibited, or on the basis of what... the soci-
ety through its democratic processes now overwhelmingly disapproves,
but on the basis of what we think "proportionate" and "measurably
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juvenile death penalty, that the penalty was infrequently used
even when permitted by state law, and that there was a "trend"
toward its abolition.18 The Court also found support in common
knowledge; in "the scientific and sociological studies respondent
and his amici cite";' 86 in the argument of defense counsel that
the death penalty was not a deterrent";"8 7 in Article 37 of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified
by "every country in the world ... save for the United States and
Somalia"; 18 in a survey of other countries; 89 and in "the over-
whelming weight of international opinion."19 The Court con-
cluded, "It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our
pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of
certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply
underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own
heritage of freedom."'9 1
Justice Scalia dissented, expressing the traditionalist view
that the majority opinion in Roper rests on a conception of judi-
cial integrity that is contrary to the Framers' conception of a fed-
eral judiciary "bound down by strict rules and precedents which
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case
that comes before them." '92 He also protested that, in Roper,
"The Court... proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation's moral
standards."19 If so-and I believe it is so-then the moral read-
ing of the Constitution takes us far from the traditionally
honored procedural and substantive constraints of the positive
law and the constitutional structure of American government.
Instead, it bears out Dworkin's contentions that anyone who
believes that ideally free and equal citizens would be guaranteed a
particular individual right by a just society would likely also think
the Constitution already contains that right unless (and even if)
constitutional history "has decisively rejected it,' 194 and that
contributory to acceptable goals of punishment"-to say and mean
that, is to replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-
kings.
Id. at 379.
185. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553-54.
186. Id. at 569.
187. Id. at 571.
188. Id. at 576.
189. Id. at 575-76.
190. Id. at 578.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 607-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 42, at 471).
193. Id. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. See DWORRIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 5, at 73.
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judges should make that determination independently of the
people.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS OF A PERFECTIONIST
CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION
Because the moral reading of the Constitution has entered
so forcefully into American constitutional jurisprudence as an
alternative to traditional judicial restraint in cases that present
controversial issues of morality and social justice, we should ask
what the broader implications of its adoption are.
First, the moral reading of the Constitution is clearly incom-
patible with traditional jurisprudence that defines judicial integ-
rity in terms of the coherence of judicial opinions with the
organic body of the positive law, itself conceived of as substan-
tively and procedurally moral. Unlike traditional jurisprudence,
the moral reading confers upon the judiciary the unreviewable
power to identify the true conditions of moral freedom at the
behest of individual litigants and to enforce its own independent
conception of the substantive requirements of true liberty and
equality on American society against the will of the majority and
against traditional conceptions of those requirements. The moral
reading thus shifts from the people to the judiciary the powers to
define the empirical limits of personal liberty and equality, to
restrain personal and collective liberty in accordance with its own
conception of the common good, and to make general laws that
further its conception of the common good, rendering the
Tenth Amendment police power, the Fourteenth Amendment
power of Congress to enforce the provisions in the amendment,
and the Article V power of the people to amend the Constitution
nugatory or, at best, vestigial.
While traditional lawmakers make laws in an assembly of
representatives of all the people, and traditional judges decide
cases by reference to the positive law and the facts of particular
cases, judges who read the Constitution morally act indepen-
dently of the positive law and the people, and they decide broad-
based "test" cases brought on behalf of interest groups. They
decide these cases not by applying American precedent, stan-
dards, and rules of construction, but by applying "values we share
with a wider civilization"' 9 5 as supported by "objective indicia of
consensus, ' 196 not to the facts of particular cases but to the facts
195. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003); see supra text accompa-
nying note 165.
196. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005); see supra text accompa-
nying note 183.
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shared by the groups and individuals who seek the enforcement
of "true" morality and who oppose the values embodied in the
laws at issue. The judgments thus reached are not incremental
additions to the positive law, confined to the facts and the law of
particular cases, but sweeping general pronouncements capable
of invalidating a broad swath of laws based only upon the inde-
pendent moral judgment of the judges themselves. And just as
judges may, at will, write into the Constitution their own concep-
tion of the law, so they may write out their predecessors'
conceptions.
The adoption of the conception of judges as empowered to
identify and protect "fundamental," substantive moral liberties
means that if a court identifies a fundamental personal right of
sexual liberty, for example, any societal constraint on that liberty
is constitutionally suspect, no matter how persuasive the sources
of general information upon which the people relied in making
the law, no matter how conducive the regulation is to the com-
mon good in the people's estimation, and no matter how deeply
the traditional constraints on the expression of that personal
right are embedded in American culture and law. The moral
reading of the Constitution also affects the reliability of prece-
dent and rules of construction as guides to the constitutionality
of the law in the area of rights, as the Supreme Court itself
acknowledged in Lawrence,"'7 undermining the integrity and pre-
dictive force of the law in this area. Indeed, each constraint on
the liberty of moral self-determination is subject to constitutional
challenge, and the only laws that can survive are those that guar-
antee the liberties the courts independently determine are ration-
ally implied by the moral concepts of liberty and equality and
whose boundaries they likewise independently determine.
The logical extension of a fundamental right of sexual lib-
erty, for example, to rapists, pornographers, polygamists, or per-
sons who commit incest, even against the will of the majority,
which the moral reading of the Due Process Clause implies,
presents a challenge when courts are asked to invalidate a gen-
eral law as unconstitutional. This challenge can be met only by
judges asking themselves the question, "Is this a fair, reasonable,
and appropriate exercise of the police power of the state, or is it
an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with
the right of the individual to his personal liberty?"-exactly the
same test of the limits of fundamental rights proposed by the
197. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003); see also supra text
accompanying note 165.
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Lochner Court.'9 8 And the answer to this question for the judici-
ary can come only from "objective indicia of consensus" as
expressed by the expert opinion of moral and political philoso-
phers and other authorities the courts choose to rely upon, since
the question is not asked when precedent and tradition affirm
the existence of a personal liberty. The result is necessarily that
as the judiciary expands upon fundamental rights without refer-
ence to enumerated, substantive constitutional principles or to
time-honored precepts and precedents the right of the people to
determine for themselves the conditions of a just society propor-
tionately diminishes.
In the philosophical and political tradition underlying the
moral reading of the Constitution, the personal liberty protected
by the Constitution is not the democratic liberty of the people to
construct equally through their elected representatives the laws
by which they consent to be governed according to majority con-
ceptions of the common good. It is, instead, the liberty of minor-
ity groups and individuals to seek from the courts recognition
and enforcement not only of a right to privacy and of constitu-
tionally-enumerated and traditionally affirmed substantive liber-
ties to which the people have assented, but also of substantive
moral liberties traditionally proscribed as contrary to the com-
mon good, and to assert these liberties as grounds for the judicial
invalidation of laws made by the people. The moral reading of
the Constitution thus rejects the political and moral authority of
the people to make those laws through their legislative represent-
atives that they themselves deem most conducive to their own
common good.
Because the moral reading of the Constitution necessarily,
and firmly, rejects the majoritarian premise in determining the
empirical boundaries of equal protection and personal liberty
lawmaking, substituting the will of the judiciary, as ultimately
expressed by a majority of the Supreme Court, for that of a
majority of the people, as expressed in the positive law, as the
moral arbiter of society. We should ask, therefore, before we
accept the moral reading with all of its implications, why the
Framers insisted that the will of the majority, and not that of
unelected sages, determine fairness and the common good. In
traditional jurisprudential terms, we should ask why the Framers
believed that the identification and regulation of substantive per-
sonal liberties should be left to legislatures, except insofar as laws
infringe constitutionally-enumerated liberties or invade tradi-
198. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905); see also supra text
accompanying note 66.
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tionally protected rights and privileges, and should not be con-
ferred on an independent judiciary with final, unfettered
authority to say what the law is. Why did the Framers not
expressly protect the individual members of society against the
moral majority?
Madison argued in The Federalist that there were only two
methods for providing against the evil of a majority united
against a minority: (1) "by creating a will in the community inde-
pendent of the [will of the] majority-that is, of the society
itself," and (2) "by comprehending in the society so many sepa-
rate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination
of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impractica-
ble."19 Because he considered the former "at best ... but a pre-
carious security," Madison favored the creation of a federal
republic in which, though all authority derives from society, the
society is "broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citi-
zens that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in
little danger from interested combinations of the majority. -200
For him, "[i]n a free government, the security for civil rights
must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one
case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multi-
plicity of sects."'2 ' Madison explained,
In the extended republic of the United States, and among
the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it
embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society
could seldom take place on any other principles than those
ofjustice and the general good; whilst there being thus less
danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there
must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the
former, by introducing into the government a will not
dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will indepen-
dent of the society itself.
20 2
A government of free people by and for themselves is, as the
Framers understood, the opposite of a society that assigns the
security for moral rights to the State as an entity whose will is
independent of, and superior to, the will of the people, even a
State embodied in a rational and beneficentjudiciary. Thus, judi-
cial assumption of the power to define, and to enforce as funda-
mental, liberties that are not embedded in the Constitution or
traditionally protected as essential to privacy or ordered liberty
199. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 42, at 323-24.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 325.
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not only violates traditional American jurisprudence and the laws
and structures promulgated by the American people to express
and protect their own conception of the public good, but it also
violates the original moral and political concept upon which the
United States was founded-the right of free and equal citizens
to make those laws for their own governance that they themselves
believe most conducive to their own common good. Even more
profoundly, the concept of the courts as the final independent
authority on morality, empowered to override any legislation
they independently deem morally invalid, violates the concept of
respect for the moral autonomy of the actual persons who make
up society, which directly implies their right to make for them-
selves those laws to which they would willingly subject themselves,
subject only to the fundamental principles of substantive and
procedural fairness they themselves have built into the law.
The genius of American constitutional government is pre-
cisely that it maintains the moral autonomy of the individual on
the societal scale while simultaneously respecting and protecting
personal moral autonomy within the sphere of private actions
and relationships. Public moral decisions are made and embed-
ded in the positive law through the collective decisions of repre-
sentatives of the people, acting on behalf of the people and with
their consent, subject only to the constraints of those procedural
and substantive liberties enumerated in the Constitution, as set
out in its plain language and interpreted over time in statutes
and case law. Respect for personal moral autonomy, or liberty,
and for the intrinsic equal worth of every individual, is never lost
in the self-creating, self-sustaining, self-correcting democratic
conception of the just society; it is never submerged in the supe-
rior will of the rational self as an entity apart from the people,
whether in the form of a legislative body or of the courts; it is
built into the procedural and substantive guarantees in the Con-
stitution, including those of Equal Protection and Due Process.
Yet it is exactly this concept of the moral autonomy of the people
that the moral reading of the Constitution rejects-locating
moral autonomy, instead, in an independent judiciary acting as
sages on behalf of individuals and in their "true" best interest to
secure the conditions of liberty and equality from infringement
by the people themselves.
Nevertheless, we should still ask whether traditional jurispru-
dence can meet the challenge posed by the moral reading of the
Constitution by satisfactorily resolving the constitutional issues of
morality and social justice presented by legal cases while respect-
ing the requirements of both moral principle and law, or
whether social evils of discrimination or the infringement of per-
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sonal liberty-especially those directed against minorities-can
be corrected, in fact, only by a wise and beneficent judiciary with
the independent authority to say what the law is.
IX. THE PERFECTIONIST CHALLENGE
TO TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
Why, we may ask, should not the moral judgments of the
majority, as expressed in state or federal laws, be overridden by
the courts if the people are wrong, as shown by right reason, or
by trends in the law, or by the opinions of experts, or by the views
of other persons elsewhere? How can morally bad law be repudi-
ated unless the judiciary takes the moral high ground and the
lead? Second, and very importantly, how else can the rights of
minorities and "unpopular" classes be protected? Third, if the
Constitution does protect a moral right to equality or a funda-
mental due process liberty interest that encompasses both a pri-
vacy interest and a fundamental right of moral self-
determination, how can these rights and liberties be judicially
recognized and protected by traditional jurists relying on the
positive law and the facts of particular cases as their only guide?
Is not the moral reading of the Constitution necessary to identify
and enforce these rights? And, finally, how can judges decide
novel questions of law presented by cases in areas of moral disa-
greement in a diverse and evolving society without making new
law based on their own best assessment of the requirements of
morality?
A. The Invalidation of Morally Bad Law
First, a critical fact, often overlooked, is that the Constitu-
tion expressly protects from governmental intrusion the substan-
tive moral liberties enumerated in it, including, for example, the
right to free expression of religion, the right to freedom of
speech, the right to assembly and petition for redress of griev-
ances, the right to freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and the right to freedom from racial discrimination. It
also protects truly private actions and traditionally protected
inter-personal liberties. If a state law violates these fundamental
substantive liberties, either facially or as applied, that law will be
invalidated by traditional jurists as unconstitutional, and if not,
not.20 3 The Constitution also provides fundamental procedural
safeguards against the deprivation of life, liberty, or property
203. A law may not be "facially unconstitutional," that is, unconstitutional
in all applications, but may nevertheless be unconstitutional as applied. See
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
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without due process of law and against unequal treatment of
"unpopular" minorities, vis-d-vis other similarly situated persons.
Thus, for example, laws that are not otherwise unconstitutional,
but that treat materially similarly situated persons unequally, or
that lack a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, will
be invalidated by traditional jurists, as well as by jurists who read
the Constitution morally.
Second-and again, often overlooked-the positive law is
self-correcting. Local, state, and national laws and judicial opinions
that violate constitutionally protected rights may be overturned
under the substantive provisions in the Bill of Rights as well as
under constitutional principles enunciated in the Ninth, Tenth,
and Fourteenth Amendments, without judges reading these pro-
visions in terms of their own understanding of morality.
To the extent a law does not violate constitutionally enumer-
ated or traditionally respected liberties, however, a traditionalist
would hold that the people are free to write into the law the val-
ues they deem most conducive to their own common safety and
happiness without fear that an independently minded judiciary
will invalidate those laws. Thus, the positive law is free to evolve
in state legislatures and in Congress as the people become per-
suaded that the laws need revising because their substantive
moral and intellectual underpinnings have been eroded by
changing circumstances and perspectives. Additionally, tradi-
tional jurists will respect and enforce the moral principles and
rights democratically embedded in the evolving positive law with-
out relying upon those evolving, subordinate laws as authority for
reading into the Constitution fundamental, substantive liberties
that trump all inconsistent laws, no matter how deeply embed-
ded in the traditions and laws of the people.
B. The Protection of Minority Rights and
"Unpopular" Moral Views
But should not the rights of "unpopular" moral minorities
be protected by appeal to the courts' informed understanding of
the requirements of morality when the laws approved by the
majority disagree with right reason or with the shared values of a
wider civilization or shock the conscience? How can the rights of
minorities be protected if the majority rules?
First, minority points of view are protected in all of the ways
just mentioned. Second, traditional jurists recognize that public
conceptions of morality do evolve, and that evolving conceptions
of morality have brought about not only amendments to the
Constitution itself but also the great Civil Rights Acts of 1960,
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1964, and 1968 and laws granting civil protections to homosexu-
als, prohibiting the execution of minors, and pursuing other
goals a majority of Americans in relevant communities have
come to deem fundamental to a well-ordered and beneficent
society in changing times and circumstances. Traditional jurists
have consistently upheld the constitutionality of these laws as
within the power of the states or Congress to enact so long as
they do not violate express procedural or substantive constitu-
tional guarantees. Indeed, traditional jurists would assert that
American law assigns the power to make general laws to legisla-
tures, not to courts, and that it accords greater weight to public
laws of general application than to judicial decisions, not the
other way around, precisely because the Framers of the Constitu-
tion believed that process more protective of the interests of all
citizens, including minorities, and the American people have not
restructured the Constitution to provide otherwise.
On a traditionalist view, when no enumerated constitutional
right, or traditionally respected substantive liberty, or procedural
violation, controls a question, there is no obvious justification
compatible with the Constitution for the courts to cut off the
debate of the American people as to how best to structure society
for the good of all-a debate both traditionally and constitution-
ally assigned to legislatures, with their superior access to informa-
tion and accountability to all the people, or to constitutional
conventions when of adequate gravity. To decide otherwise is to
decree the tyranny of minority views of social morality and to iso-
late that tyranny from the scrutiny of the people in the market-
place of ideas.
C. The Protection of Personal Liberty
But the question still remains of how adherence to tradi-
tional jurisprudence can ensure that government does not
intrude upon our private lives or purely personal moral decision
making, and how it can ensure the protection of non-enumerated
liberties traditionally deemed fundamental to ordered liberty
without the courts defining the substantive moral rights intruded
upon or worthy of protection, such as a right to sexual freedom,
and, in so doing, recognizing new, substantive constitutional lib-
erties with life and substance of their own. This, I believe, is the
hardest question for traditional jurisprudence. It is answered by
the recognition that both privacy and the people's constitutional
right to constrain the social expression of moral values within the
bounds they themselves deem fundamental to ordered liberty are
protected only when judges confine their identification of pri-
20081
294 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 22
vacy rights to choices that are truly personal and private and to
traditionally respected personal liberties, as they are presented in
particular cases, respecting the right of the people to define and
redefine through legislation, within express constitutional con-
straints, the boundaries of self-determination when personal
expression becomes interpersonal and a societal arbiter is
required, i.e., when a sufficient empirical moral nexus arises.
Traditional and non-traditional jurists can agree that when
people's personal moral interests within the zone of privacy are
at stake-i.e., when truly private behavior is at stake that does not
interfere with the rights of others or with a regulative scheme
rationally deemed conducive to the public good-we do not
expect government to tell us what to do, or to decide what soci-
ety's view of "right" reason or "true" morality or justice requires.
However, personal moral concerns become social concerns when
they are invoked to limit the moral or legal rights of others, or
when they otherwise affect the common good, presenting a
nexus of empirical moral concern that requires an arbiter,
whether private or public, to order the liberties we exercise
against each other. Thus, the first step for courts in determining
where to draw the line between judicially protected, truly per-
sonal moral decisions and moral matters of public concern sub-
ject to state regulation is to ask where the spheres of purely
private moral concern and public moral concern intersect. And,
for those boundaries, traditional jurists look to tradition and to
rules and standards as embodied in the positive law rather than
making an independent assessment of the rational requirements
of morality, or public health, or safety, or welfare, and using that
as a touchstone to invalidate state laws.
For example, when a person decides not to continue his own
chemotherapy for a deadly cancer, the right asserted is a per-
sonal, moral liberty, or a right to make a private, moral decision,
that is firmly protected from State interference by the Ninth,
Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Neither legislatures nor
courts have traditionally intruded into this area of personal,
moral decision making. But when a parent stops chemotherapy
for her toddler against the wishes of the other parent and against
medical advice that the treatment is necessary to save the child's
life, or when one relative seeks to continue life support and
another refuses, a nexus of empirical moral concern is presented
in which an arbiter is required. If the matter cannot be privately
resolved, and particularly if the problem is recurrent, the power
of the State may be invoked to resolve it through the courts or
through legislation. The asserted moral right, or liberty, then
becomes a publicly enforceable positive legal right that takes its
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place within the body of the positive law that society maintains to
advance its collective conception of human dignity and moral
autonomy. So long as the enforcement of that right violates no
procedural or substantive law, it should be constitutionally
sound.
D. The Resolution of Novel Questions of Law
But what of legal cases that present novel moral issues? How
can judges not answer these questions morally? First, many of the
controversial moral questions that perfectionists contend evade
resolution within the positive law are not novel, and their resolu-
tion demonstrably does not require extraordinary recourse to
the courts, as shown by the cases addressed above. However,
some cases genuinely do present novel moral issues. These are
cases in which there is no positive law on point or in which the
law being tested is a new one in a developing area.
Take, for example, the novel moral and legal problems
raised by human cloning, or by personal decisions to create and
provide human embryos or fetuses for scientific experimenta-
tion, or by the combination of human genes with animal genes to
create hybrids or organ farms, or by the disposition at divorce of
cryogenically frozen embryos created by in vitro fertilization, or
by the bearing of children by surrogate mothers, or by the use of
fertilization procedures to create children for homosexual part-
ners, or by the custody of children when partners in legally
unrecognized situations forsake each other. These matters are
not always amenable to private resolution; nor, arguably, should
they be left to such resolution, since they directly and indirectly
affect the differing moral interests of different persons and an
entire body of social arrangements requiring the regularity of law
in the interest of the community as a whole. For example, fertility
clinics need guidelines for the disposition of frozen embryos
when their clients divorce; surrogate mothers need assurance of
their legal rights in different circumstances, or the assurance that
they have none; and unmarried sexual partners, whether homo-
sexual or heterosexual, need assurances as to the legal rights they
likewise do and do not have with respect to the custody of
children.
Law is just being made in these areas. How should it be
made when a legal case involving moral disagreement that affects
interpersonal rights presents itself and the legislature has not
acted? Again, one possible approach-compatible with the moral
reading of the Constitution-is for the courts to define and
enforce as fundamental those substantive liberties they indepen-
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dently determine are implied by the moral concept of liberty
embedded in the Due Process Clause-liberties such as the right
to sexual freedom, or the right to reproductive freedom, or the
right to moral non-discrimination-and to balance these "funda-
mental rights" against enumerated constitutional rights and state
interests the courts independently deem "compelling." In other
words, the courts could take the substantive due process
approach that Lochner and Lawrence both exemplify. But there
are problems with this approach, and there is no need to adopt
it.
Take the hypothetical case where a law banning human
cloning has reached the Supreme Court because someone wishes
to clone an embryo to extract stem cells to cure his disease.
Should the law be invalidated on the ground it interferes with a
broad, fundamental positive right to the integrity of one's body
or to reproductive freedom? If so, what happens when a wife
wants to clone her own child and her husband does not want her
to do it? Does this same general right of self-determination in
sexual or reproductive matters apply? If not, why not? How about
the husband's implied fundamental right not to become a par-
ent? And does the Court then need to balance the reproductive
rights of the potential legal (if not physical) parents of the
cloned embryo? Where does the balancing stop? These are ques-
tions for philosophers. A traditional jurist would say they are also
questions for legislators, who are in a much better position than
judges to assess all of the factors relevant to the situation in which
a general rule is sought, to determine all of the interests affected
(not just those of parties to a legal case), and to assess all of the
foreseeable effects of a potential general rule on affected
interests.
Traditional judges do not seek to maintain the moral and
legal integrity of the law by deriving fundamental, substantive
legal rights from abstract moral principles, unilaterally defining
their boundaries, and enforcing them as broad substantive prin-
ciples according to their own "constructive interpretation" of the
best legal practices of the community, 20 4 constraining the right
of the people to make their own laws in the interest of assuring
the "true" liberty and equality of all. They confine the exercise of
their constructive or interpretive judgment to the relevant law
and the facts of particular cases. They first identify the problem
presented by a case or controversy. If constitutional or statutory
law is applicable, they apply it as interpreted in the positive law;
or, if the law is challenged as unconstitutional, facially or as
204. See DWORIN, LAw's EMPiRE, supra note 4, at 225.
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applied, they determine whether it is indeed unconstitutional
under traditional criteria, and they invalidate it if it conflicts with
enumerated constitutional principles or intrudes upon privacy or
traditionally affirmed personal liberties. If there is no controlling
constitutional or statutory law, or if the law is unsettled, or if it
has not been previously interpreted, traditional judges look to
procedural rules, rules of construction, and past decisions in
analogous cases for guidance. With recourse to the courts to
resolve the conflict, an otherwise private moral controversy
becomes a legal controversy entailing ajudgment that enters the
body of accrued positive case law, which remains flexible and
subject to future adjustment on a case-by-case basis as it awaits
the development of a sufficient empirical need for a uniform
general law to generate legislative action-at which point refine-
ment through judicial interpretation in particular cases begins
anew.
Perfectionism is neither necessary nor efficacious to ensure
that the conditions of individual liberty and equality essential to
our democracy are respected and implemented. Rather, it under-
mines those conditions. But perfectionist decisions are not the
only decisions that have defined the course of rights-based juris-
prudence since Brown and Griswold were decided.
X. THE TRADITIONAIisT ALTERNATIVE
While the Supreme Court has read the Fourteenth Amend-
ment morally in a number of landmark cases over the past half
century, it has also taken a traditional approach in a number of
other cases, respecting both negative personal liberty, or privacy
rights, and the positive liberty of the people under the Tenth and
Fourteenth Amendments to define the boundaries of personal
liberty through legislation in ways the people rationally deem
conducive to the common good.
A. Troxel v. Granville
In Troxel v. Granville, for example, the Supreme Court con-
sidered a state law interpreted by the Washington Supreme
Court as permitting paternal grandparents to obtain court-
ordered visitation with their late son's children over the objec-
tions of the child's fit mother.2 "5 The Troxel Court held the state
law was unconstitutional and invaded the fundamental due-pro-
cess right of parents to make decisions as to the care, custody,
205. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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and control of children.2 °6 But the Court did not attempt to
define the boundaries of the fundamental right to raise one's
children, leaving it to be determined in particular cases and,
where the nexus of moral concern presented was sufficiently
compelling to justify a new law, leaving it to the states.
20 7
B. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
Similarly, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,
the Supreme Court considered whether Missouri had the power
to determine whether a statement by Nancy Cruzan that she
would not want to live in a vegetative state, made a year before an
accident left her in such a state, was insufficient proof of her
desire to have her hydration and nutrition withdrawn, or
whether the law permitting that review infringed Cruzan's pro-
tected constitutional right to refuse life-saving medical treat-
ment.20 8 As in Lochner, the Court held that the question of
whether a person's liberty interest under the Due Process Clause
(here, in refusing unwanted medical treatment) has been
invaded by a state law "must be determined by balancing the lib-
erty interest against relevant state interests," namely, in Cruzan,
the "general interest in the protection and preservation of
human life."2' 9 Nevertheless, while the rationale was that of Loch-
ner, the result was traditional in that the Supreme Court recog-
nized a traditional personal liberty interest in refusing life-
sustaining treatment while leaving it to the state of Missouri to
determine, in the exercise of its police power, how best to pro-
tect and enforce that fundamental liberty interest when other
compelling state interests, i.e., interpersonal interests requiring
the regularity of law, were affected by its enforcement.
210
206. Id. at 72.
207. See id. at 72-73. States have regulated the right to rear one's chil-
dren, for instance, when parents place their children in grave and immediate
danger or when parents divorce and their interests in their children conflict,
and those laws have generally not been challenged for their constitutionality or
have been upheld when challenged.
208. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285 (1990).
209. Id. at 262. A traditionalist court would have determined whether the
right was a traditionally respected privacy right (it was) and whether the law was
rationally related to the protection of that right and did not infringe other pro-
tected rights.
210. See id. at 287. Twelve years before Cruzan, the Supreme Court
applied a Lochner-type balancing test to the right to marry, which it held to be
'one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men" that are protected by the Due Process Clause and, since Griswold,
have been recognized as "part of the. .. 'right of privacy.'" Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967)). This right was, of course, not a personal liberty protected from state
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In effect, the Court recognized that the exercise of the per-
sonal moral right of a comatose patient to refuse life-sustaining
care has a public aspect affecting interpersonal interests and that
the orderly channeling of these interests through general state
laws is appropriate to protect the rights of all interested persons,
such as the unconscious patient herself, family members who
might wish to continue or discontinue such treatment, and the
doctors and hospital charged with her care. Since Missouri's law
did not intrude upon the zone of privacy, but protected the exer-
cise of individual moral judgment within general boundaries that
did not infringe a constitutional right, the Court concluded that
the determination as to what constituted legal consent to discon-
tinue treatment was properly left to the state.
C. Washington v. Glucksberg
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court once again
recognized that there 'are certain fundamental moral interests
not enumerated as rights in the Constitution that include both a
private aspect and a public aspect, and that the public aspect of
those fundamental interests is subject to state regulation so long
as the regulation rationally furthers common interests and does
not infringe traditionally protected personal liberties. 21 Glucks-
intrusion but a right, or privilege, traditionally regulated by religious authorities
and state law.
Justice Stewart, concurring, refused to recognize "a 'right to marry' in the
constitutional sense," arguing that "[t]hat right, or more accurately that privi-
lege, is under our federal system peculiarly one to be defined and limited by
state law." Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring). In other words, like
Justice Goldberg in Griswold, Justice Stewart recognized that the Constitution
protects traditional liberty interests, but he denied that the courts have the
authority to identify substantive liberties as constitutionally implied and to
define the boundaries of those liberties. He opined, "Although the Court pur-
ports to examine the bases for legislative classifications and to compare the
treatment of legislatively defined groups, it actually erects substantive limita-
tions on what States may do.... Such restrictions on basic governmental power
are at the heart of substantive due process." Id. at 395. He would have addressed
the rationality of the law in question-which prevented men who had failed to
pay child support from marrying-under traditional standards of review. See id.
at 396. Justice Powell, likewise, would have recognized that domestic relations
had long been regarded "as a virtually exclusive province of the states," limited
only under the Due Process Clause by a showing of governmental intrusion into
"deeply rooted traditions" and under the Equal Protection Clause by the lack of
a substantive relation to the objective of the legislation. See id. at 398-99 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring) (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)). Both
would have reached the same conclusion as the majority, that the law was
invalid.
211. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (recognizing
rights to marry, have children, direct the education and upbringing of one's
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berg had argued for the judicial recognition of a fundamental
constitutional right to assisted suicide under the Due Process
Clause, i.e., an enforceable, non-traditional substantive due pro-
cess right embodying the positive liberty of self-determination.
The Supreme Court held that while the Due Process Clause
protects the traditionally affirmed personal right to refuse
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment, assisted suicide is not a
traditionally recognized fundamental personal liberty interest, as
shown by the fact that legislatures have consistently refused to
recognize, define, and enforce such a legal right.2" 2 Thus, the
Court recognized that the assertion of a right to legally-protected
and legally-assisted suicide went beyond a demand for the recog-
nition of a right to make private moral decisions and implicated
the people's constitutional authority under the Tenth Amend-
ment to regulate areas of interpersonal moral concern in which
rights may conflict and moral views may differ. A ruling invalidat-
ing the law could not have been supported on the ground that
the law violated an enumerated constitutional provision or a tra-
ditionally protected fundamental liberty, or that it invaded the
zone of privacy. It could have found support only in the Court's
own independent moral judgment that persons assisting suicide
should be accorded the protection of law. In Glucksberg, the
Supreme Court did not assert its own independent moral judg-
ment or identify a fundamental positive right of self-determina-
tion that encompassed a right to assisted suicide.
D. Gonzales v. Carhart
In Gonzales v. Carhart,2 3 decided in 2007, the Supreme
Court revisited the fundamental constitutional right of a woman
to an abortion it had recognized in Roe v. Wade and further
refined in Roe's progeny.2 4 In Gonzales, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a law passed by Congress outlawing a late-
term abortion procedure called "intact dilation and evacuation"
or "partial-birth abortion," in which the fetus is partially deliv-
ered and then killed. The Court accepted as controlling the
children, maintain marital privacy, use contraception, preserve bodily integrity,
and have an abortion).
212. Id. at 720-23.
213. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
214. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (declaring unconstitu-
tional a state ban on partial-birth abortions because the statute unduly bur-
dened the woman's right to choose abortion at all); Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (refining Roe's trimester framework into the
"undue burden" test while upholding Roe in the interest of stare decisis).
TWO CONCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
"three-part 'essential holding"' of Roe,2 15 detailing the constitu-
tional standard for regulation of the right to an abortion, but it
focused on Casey's premise "that the government has a legitimate
and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal
life. ' 216
The Court phrased the issue in the case as whether
"[r] egulations which do no more than create a structural mecha-
nism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor,
may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are per-
mitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exer-
cise of the right to choose."2 y Using this standard, the Court
conducted a traditional analysis of the Act and determined that
"the Act is not void for vagueness, does not impose an undue
burden from any overbreadth, and is not invalid on its face. '"218
Acknowledging that "[u] nder the principles accepted as control-
ling here," i.e., the principles announced in Roe, the Act "would
be unconstitutional 'if its purpose or effect is to place a substan-
tial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before
the fetus attains viability,' ,,2 19 the Court determined that the Act
did not "on its face impose a substantial obstacle" to the exercise
of the right to late-term but pre-viability abortions, and it rejected
"this further facial challenge to its validity. ' 220 The Court indi-
cated that the Act could still be subject to constitutional attack as
applied in "discrete and well-defined instances." 22 ' However, it
concluded that broad facial challenges on the constitutionality of
a statute impose a heavy burden on the challenger that was not
met.2 2 2 The dissent passionately disagreed with what it regarded
as the Court's refusal to take seriously the progeny of Roe, in
which the Court had "endeavored to provide secure guidance to
'[s]tate and federal courts as well as legislatures throughout the
Union,' by defining 'the rights of the woman and the legitimate
authority of the State respecting the termination of pregnancies
by abortion procedures.' "223
Gonzales clearly presents a conundrum: what does a court of
final authority-a Supreme Court-do when a fundamental sub-
215. See supra text accompanying notes 132-38.
216. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1626.
217. Id. at 1627 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1632 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1638.
222. Id. at 1639.
223. Id. at 1640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at
845).
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stantive due process right discovered and implemented by a
prior Court that has read the Constitution morally provokes
ongoing resistance from both Congress and the states? Does the
Court continue to reassert its authority to say what the law is and
to refine and expand its guidelines to respond to each new chal-
lenge, explaining and protecting its construction of the liberties
implicit in the Constitution, as the Gonzales dissent urged? What
does a subsequent Court do if it disapproves of the moral read-
ing of the Constitution and believes that, in discovering a right
implicit in the concept of liberty and implementing that right as
a fundamental constitutional right, a prior Court has invaded
legislative power, but believes itself bound by the strict rules and
precedents in the positive law? Or what does a subsequent Court
do if it agrees that the Constitution should be read morally but
thinks a substantive due process right implemented by a prior
Court is not the best constructive interpretation of the commu-
nity's legal practice and that the better course-the moral
course-is to repudiate the right in the interest of a more-
enlightened reading of the Constitution? Lower courts face no
such dilemma: they must follow precedent. But a court of last
resort does face a dilemma in which it must ask itself not only
where the limits of its own power and those of the coordinate
branches of government intersect, but also what the conse-
quences are for the ongoing body of the positive law, whatever
decision it makes.
XI. CONCLUSION: THE DEFENSE OF TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
The moral reading of the Constitution has an undeniable
allure as an efficient means of reconciling differing moral views
in a morally diverse society and of ensuring the rationally and
morally "best" interpretation of constitutional guarantees of lib-
erty and equality according to prevailing academic philosophy.
Ultimately, however, the conception of judges as moral arbiters
charged with independently implementing the requirements of a
truly democratic society has serious implications for the preserva-
tion of the actual American democratic ideal of the just society as
a nation of intrinsically moral laws made by the people them-
selves for their own governance, subject to such constraints as
they themselves approve, and interpreted by just judges bound
by the strict rules and precedents in the positive law. Even more
profoundly, if morality consists in equal respect for the intrinsic
dignity and worth of each actual person, and a just actual society
is one in which respect for the personal liberty and equality of all
its members as both makers and subjects of the positive law deter-
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mines the outcome of legislative and judicial decisions, the moral
reading of the Constitution, with its scorn for both actual democ-
racy and the positive law, fails both as a democratic political the-
ory and as a moral theory. It cannot, therefore, serve as a fair
and rational guide to social justice.
Not only is there no need to resort to the moral reading of
the Constitution to resolve legal cases that present controversial
issues of morality or social justice, but it is simply not the case
that the moral reading is justified as a fair and rational means of
implementing the true conditions of the just democratic society
contemplated by the Constitution. Nor is it the case, as those
who advocate the moral reading of the Constitution argue, that
traditional jurisprudence fails to provide answers to novel or
"hard" questions of law that implicate morality, or that it sup-
ports the tyranny of the moral majority against unpopular moral
views, or that it ignores the rights of minorities to fair and equal
treatment and thus institutionalizes injustice, or that it fails to
protect personal moral liberty, or that it preserves morally bad
law. Traditional jurisprudence is available to resolve even those
difficult cases that present the most divisive legal and moral
issues in a morally diverse democratic society, like our own, and
those that do present truly novel issues-and to resolve them
incrementally, flexibly, and in synchronization with the morality
of the people and the evolving positive law, preserving both sub-
stantive and procedural liberty and equality for all. That is its
enduring strength. And that is why we should not lightly reject
the traditional conception of judicial integrity or lightly adopt
the moral reading of the Constitution.
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